Can Afghanistan Live Up to the Expectations of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative\u27s Expectations and Achieve Compliant Status to Help Improve Good Governance in Its Natural Resources Sector? by Esmati, Parwiz
Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture,
& Natural Resources Law
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 2
2015
Can Afghanistan Live Up to the Expectations of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's
Expectations and Achieve Compliant Status to
Help Improve Good Governance in Its Natural
Resources Sector?
Parwiz Esmati
University of Washington
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kjeanrl
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Journal of
Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Esmati, Parwiz (2015) "Can Afghanistan Live Up to the Expectations of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's
Expectations and Achieve Compliant Status to Help Improve Good Governance in Its Natural Resources Sector?," Kentucky Journal of
Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law: Vol. 7 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kjeanrl/vol7/iss2/2
CAN AFGHANISTAN LIVE UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF
THE EXTRACTIvE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE'S EXPECTATIONS AND ACHIEVE COMPLIANT
STATUS TO HELP IMPROVE GOOD GOVERNANCE IN ITS
NATURAL RESOURCE SECTOR?
Parwiz Esmati
ABSTRACT
T he discovery of an estimated three trillion dollars worth of naturalresource deposits in Afghanistan is seen as very promising for the
country's economic development. Yet, foreign observers and experts on
Afghanistan believe that this discovery may escalate ongoing governance issues.
These issues include corrupting governing institutions, empowering warlords to
misuse public funds, sabotaging economic development, and stunting the
growth of civil society, ultimately resulting in "the resource curse"-an interrelated
set of social and economic pathologies that often plague resource-rich countries.
As a response to the threat of such consequences, Afghanistan has sought
candidacy status under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EM).
The EITI promotes transparency and good governance by requiring companies
involved in the extraction of natural resources to publish what they pay and
governments to disclose what they receive. This article asserts that Afghanistan
can achieve compliant status under EITI, but in order to avoid the resource curse
in the process, it must integrate strong civil society controls, show commitment
and political will, and deepen legal commitments to transparency. The article
begins by comparing Botswana and Nigeria's experiences of discovering natural
resources, and it identifies how their successes and failures can be used as a lesson
for how to avoid the resource curse in Afghanistan. Next, it explores the
challenges Afghanistan will likely face as it attempts to comply with the EITI
requirements. Finally, this article concludes that to achieve compliance under the
EITI and avoid the resource curse, Afghanistan will have to solidify its legal
commitments, strengthen its political will, and monitor implementation of the
EITI by maintaining a strong and neutral civil society.
* PhD Student, University of Washington School of Law, 2014.
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AFGHANISTAN EXPECTATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION: NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION IN
AFGHANISTAN
In ancient days, with its position on the overland trading route between
China and Europe, Afghanistan attracted merchants from great distances
because of its minerals from the eastern Hindu Kush, including copper, iron,
magnesium, salt, rubies, gold, lapis lazuli, and lithium. These resources,
however, were largely left unexploited, with the exception of small-scale
traditional production.'
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Afghan government began more systematic
exploration of Afghanistan's natural resources, and by the 1970s, additional
mineral reserves were discovered and targeted for development, including
coal, iron ore, copper ore, and gemstones.2 During the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, "the Soviets planned to
develop [the] country's mineral deposits for export to the USSR; however,
ongoing hostilities severely hampered this effort, and the Soviets eventually
abandoned this project."3 By the mid-1990s, there was little mineral or oil
and gas extraction because of the security issues posed by the civil war, and
later, the rule of the Taliban.'
In 2011, analysis by the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
indicated significant natural resource reserves throughout Afghanistan. 5
These natural resources, including copper, iron, and lithium, are estimated
I NATHAN Assocs. INC. AND Louis BERGER INT'L, INC., MINERAL RESOURCES IN
AFGHANISTAN 9 (1992) [hereinafter NATHAN & BERGER'S FINAL REPORT], available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNABL961.pdf, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT OF NON-FUEL MINERAL RESOURCES OF AFGHANISTAN 1 (2007), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3063/fs2007-3063.pdf.
2 Id. at 11; Michel Chossudovsky, The War is Worth Waging: Afghanistan's Vast Reserves ofMinerals
andNatural Gas, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-war-is-worth-
waging-afghanistan-s-vast-reserves-of-minerals-and-natural-gas/19769.
3 NATHAN & BERGER'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Nikolai Malishevski, The Pentagon's
Map ofAfghanistan:An Eldorado ofMineral Wealth andNatural Resources, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Aug. 8,
2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pentagon-s-map-of-afghanistan-an-eldorado-of-mineral-
wealth-and-natural-resources/32265.
4Jaes Risen, US. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&
5 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WORLD PETROLEUM RESOURCES PROJECT, ASSESSMENT
OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF THE AMU DARYA BASIN AND AFGHAN-TAJIK
BASIN PROVINCES, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, AND UZBEKISTAN (2011)
[hereinafter USGS 2011], available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3154/report/FS11-3154.pdf; Risen,
supra note 4.
2014-2015] 193
194 KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC., &NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol.7 No.2
to be worth trillions of dollars.' USGS scientists have worked closely with
Afghan geologists, both to verify previous Soviet and Afghan mineral
research and to expand the total knowledge of Afghanistan's mineral wealth.
In June 2010, after two years of exhaustive research in dose cooperation with
the government of Afghanistan and the Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations, the USGS released the results for twenty-four areas of prime
mineral development throughout Afghanistan. Many of these areas have
"world-dass formations, with large deposits of critical and strategic minerals
such as rare earths, gold, copper, and iron."'
The analysis also indicated that the natural resource deposits are not
specific to a single region, but are spread throughout Afghanistan. Both the
largest petroleum resource potential in Afghanistan and all of the known
crude oil and natural gas reserves are located in northern Afghanistan, mainly
in two petroliferous geologic basins-the Amu Darya Basin to the west and
the Afghan-Tajik Basin to the east.' The largest deposits of lithium, as large
as those of Bolivia, which currently has the world's largest known lithium
reserves, are situated in central-eastern Afghanistan, mainly in Ghazni
province.'o The notable deposits of niobium, a soft metal used in producing
superconducting steel, rare earth elements, and significant gold deposits are
found in southern parts ofAfghanistan." The large dry salt lakes deposits are
traced to western parts of Afghanistan.12 Finally, the largest copper and iron
deposits in Eurasia and South Asia, Aynak copper deposit and Hadjigek iron
deposit, are located near central Kabul."
6 Risen, supra note 4; Afghanistan sits on $1 Trillion motheriode, ABC NEWS (June 15, 2010, 10:09
AM) [hereinafter ABC], http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-06-15/afghanistan-sits-on-1-trillion-
mineral-motherlode/866834; UN Chief Says Discovery of Vast Mineral Deposits in Afghanistan Should Be
Managed Properly, UNAMA (Nov. 8, 2012), [hereinafter UNAMA], http://unama.unmissions.org
/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=12254&nid=15756&temID=35927.
7 Risen, supra note 4.
' Alex Demas, Assessing Afghanistan: Science for a Better Future: New Report Reveals Large Deposits
of Critical and Strategic Minerals, USGS SCIENCE FEATURES (Sep. 29, 2011, 4:02 PM),
http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs-top-story/assessing-afghanistan.
9 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF
NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN 1 (2006), available at http://escweb.wr.usgs.gov/share/mooney
/USGS%20petroleum%20assessment.pdf.
o Risen, supra note 4; ABC, supra note 6.
" Risen, supra note 4.
12 Id.
" Malishevski, supra note 3;J Edward Conway, How Afghanistan Can Escape The Resource Curse,
FOREIGNPOLICY(Feb. 29,2012), http//www.foreignaffairs.com/artides/137306/j-edward-conway/how-
afghanistan-can-escape-the-resource-curse.
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This abundance of resources is promising for the Afghan economy,
which has suffered from decades of war. Afghanistan's mineral revenues
could greatly improve the country's economy and provide funds for future
development.14 The natural resource deposits, especially iron and copper, are
potentially large enough to make Afghanistan one of the top producers in the
world." As such, the government of Afghanistan is moving forward with its
plans to develop the country's mineral resources. The data collected by the
USGS and the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations will play an
important part in reducing the risks to companies interested in investing in
the mining of these minerals.'"
The relationship between the Afghan government and the USGS,
however, could be problematic if not approached carefully. If the USGS leads
the discovery effort, while failing to cede leadership and control to the
Afghan government, the U.S. risks repeating the mistakes of the Soviet
occupation. Soviet control over resources was achieved by political
maneuver." Following the communist coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion
in 1979, Soviet aid to Afghanistan increased dramatically in return for
permission to exploit Afghanistan's natural resources and export them back
to the USSR.'" This relationship led many Afghans to believe that the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan for its strategic geopolitical value and abundant
natural resources. 9 Afghan people have viewed the United States' occupation
similarly, believing that the Afghanistan was invaded to secure access to
precious natural resources and to gain strategic geopolitical value. 20 Hence, if
the USGS leads the discovery and extraction of natural resources in
Afghanistan, this effort may confirm Afghan suspicions regarding the United
14 UNAMA, supra note 6.
15 ABC, supra note 6; UNAMA, supra note 6.
16 Id.
" See generally William Maley, Afghanistan: An Historical and GeographicalAppraisal, 92 NO. 880
INT'L REVIEW OFTHE RED CROSS, Dec. 31,2010, at 859 (discussing the historical impact of the Soviet
occupation in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and beyond).
s NATHAN &BERGER'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-13; Chossudovsky, supra note 2.
19 Maley, supra note 17.
20 Kim Sengupta, Afghanistan's Resources Could Make it the Richest Mining Region on Earth, THE
INDEPENDENT NEWS (June 15, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghanistans-
resources-could-make-it-the-richest-mining-region-on-earth-2000507.htnl; Andrew B., Afghanistan's
Valuable Natural Resources Ensure Full U.S. Withdrawal Is Impossible, FAILED EMPIRE WORD PRESS
(May 4, 2011), http://failedempire.wordpress.com/2011/05/04/afghanistans-valuable-natural-resources-
ensure-fiull-u-s-withdrawal-is-impossible/.
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States. This could potentially result in further loss of trust by the Afghan
people. Political interests aside, researchers agree that the discovery of these
minerals could transform Afghanistan into one of the most important mining
centers in the world,21which could build Afghanistan's economy and free it
from reliance on foreign aid.22
With this potential fortune comes the risk of mismanagement in a
country where corruption is already pervasive. In 2009, Afghanistan's
Ministry of Mines was accused of accepting a $30 million bribe to award
China the rights to develop its copper mines.2 3 In addition to the risk of
corruption, the discovery could incentivize insurgents to fight more fiercely
to regain control of the country. Thus, for these minerals to benefit all
Afghan citizens and promote sustainable development, the industry needs to
be managed transparently..
By committing to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's
(EITI) standards and seeking candidacy status, Afghanistan has already
taken a big step towards brining accountability and transparency to its mining
industry. The EITI is a "voluntary coalition of governments, corporations,
civil society groups, investors, and international organizations" that was
"created in 2002/2003 to improve transparency, and therefore, accountability
in governments and extractive producers in resource-rich countries," like
Afghanistan. 24 It was formed in response to the observation that corruption
increases when massive revenues from extractive industries are not managed
on behalf of a country's common good.25 Afghanistan took a major step in
deterring corruption when it became an EITI Candidate country on February
10, 2010.26
21 Risen, supra note 4.
22 ABC, supra note 6.
23 Sengupta, supra note 20; Risen, supra note 4.
24 MARY ELLA KEBLUSEK, Is EITI REALLY HELPING IMPROVE GLOBAL GOOD
GOVERNANCE? EXAMINING THE RESOURCE CURSE, CORRUPTION, AND NIGERIA'S EITI
IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE 2 (2010).
2
sSee generally Helmut Weidner, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, in HANDBOOK OF
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 236 (Thomas Hale and David
Held eds., 2011); see also KEBLUSEK, supra note 24; NICK KOCHAN AND ROBIN GOODYEAR,
CORRUPTION: THE NEW CORPORATE CHALLENGES 131 (2011); Alexandra Gillies and Page Dykstra,
International Campaigns for Extractive Industry Transparency in Post-Conflict Settings, in CORRUPTION
AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: SELLING THE PEACE?, 244- 45 (Christine S. Cheng and
Dominik Zaum eds., 2012).
26 MOORE STEPHENS, AFGHANISTAN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
(AEITI): AFGHANISTAN FIRST EITI RECONCILIATION REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1387 AND 1388
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The actual effectiveness of Afghanistan's EITI membership in reducing
corruption is a question beyond the scope of this article. There is no doubt,
however, that implementation of the EITI reporting requirements has
already led Afghanistan to make some improvements in the governance of its
natural resources extraction.2 7 The Afghan government published the first
and second national reconciliation reports, which required an independent
audit firm to collect, collate, and reconcile all material payments made by
relevant extractive companies and revenues received by the government
between 2008-2010.28 These reports allowed the Afghan people to track the
government's natural resource-driven revenues and expenditures.
Nevertheless, significant concerns remain about how Afghanistan is
implementing the EITI program. Despite the publication of the first and
second reports, after two years of candidacy, Afghanistan has yet to integrate
the EITI reporting requirements into its domestic laws. 29 As a result,
questions remain regarding whether Afghanistan can meet the expectations
of the EITI."
Following this introduction, Part II of this article identifies risk factors
associated with bad governance in the mining industry that could lead to the
resource curse. This section examines how Nigeria and Botswana managed
the discovery of their natural resources, comparing their contexts and
experiences with those in Afghanistan. Part III will describe the EITI in
detail and discuss how it could promote transparency in Afghanistan's
mining industry. This part will also discuss where Afghanistan stands today
in its commitment to the EITI, what steps have been taken to ensure effective
implementation of the EITI, and what remains to be done. In Part IV, this
article presents a critique of Afghanistan's commitment to implementation
of the EITI standards, evaluating the strengths and weakness of the way the
governance regime has tried to implement the EITI thus far. This article
posits that Afghanistan will need to incorporate the EITI into its domestic
1, 4 (July 2012) [hereinafter AEITI First Report], . available at
http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Summary-ofAfghanistan's-firstEITI_report_-_final[1].pdf.27 d.
28 d
29 Afghanistan - Implementation, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Feb. 10,
2010), http://eiti.org/Afghanistan/implementation.
so Id.; Weidner, supra note 25, at 240.
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laws and remove certain legal and regulatory obstacles to become a fully
compliant EITI member. Central to achieving that goal is a strong and
neutral civil society composed of an organized body of neutral and Afghan
and non-Afghan citizens charged with overseeing compliance with the
EITI's standards. A strong civil society could also provide oversight
mechanisms for mining sector revenues and expenditures.
II. NATURAL RESOURCES: A BLESSING OR A CURSE FOR
AFGHANISTAN?
History shows that for many countries, the discovery of valuable
resources has lead to corruption and an imbalanced distribution of wealth.3 1
Accordingly, the USGS's discovery of around $1-3 trillion worth of natural
resources in Afghanistan has triggered a discussion over whether this is, in
fact, a blessing or a curse for the country's war and drug ravaged economy.2
This section explores whether Afghanistan's newly discovered wealth would
likely promote economic growth and political stability or lead to more
corruption and violence.
This question has come to the attention of observers of Afghanistan,
many of which have expressed serious concerns about the country's trajectory.
Some are predicting that Afghanistan will follow in Nigeria's footsteps,
becoming a victim of the "resource curse."33 Others believe that with careful
management and well-designed policy efforts, Afghanistan can follow the
example of Botswana and maintain a stable government and foster economic
growth.3' This section will explore the phenomenon of the "resource curse,"
then compare the experiences of Botswana and Nigeria to gain insight into
how Afghanistan might avoid it.
" See Halvor Mehium, Karl Moene, & Ragnar Torvik, Cursed by Resources or Institutions?, 29 No.8
THE WORLD ECONOMY 1117, 1117-19 (2006).
32 Stephen Haber & Victor Menaldo, Afghanistan and the 'Resource Curse,' WALL ST. JOURNAL
(July 2, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870342600457533
8461852379140.html; Jacob Goldstein, WillAfghanistan Fall Victim To the 'Natural Resource Curse?, NPR
(June 14, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/06/14/127834173/wil-afghanistan-
fall-victim-to-the-resource-curse.
33 Haber & Menaldo, supra note 32; A Resource Curse in Afghanistan?, ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR
21ST CENTURY (June 15, 2010), http://ww.w.economics2l.org/blog/resource-curse-afghanistan.
' Goldstein, supra note 32.
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A. Resource Curse: the Concept
Conventional economic reasoning suggests that an increase in a
country's stock of assets or natural resources provides greater opportunities
for economic development. 1s Recent studies on natural resources and
economic growth, however, cast doubt on this assumption. 6 For instance, in
Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis,
Richard Auty studied the impact of the 1960s and 1970s mineral boom in
four developing American countries and two Sub-Saharan countries. After a
thorough analysis, he found that mineral-rich countries that failed to create
sounds policies and well-designed institutions would not only fail to benefit
from this favorable endowment, they might actually perform worse than
countries with less mineral resources.
These findings are supported by a 2013 publication from the Revenues
Watch Institute (RWI). The RWI is a non-profit policy institute and grant
making organization that promotes the effective, transparent, and liable
management of natural resources for the public good. " The institute
published the 2013 Resource Governance Index (RGI) to measure a
country's transparency and accountability in its oil, gas, and mining sector.
The 2013 RGI shows a striking governance deficit in natural resource
management worldwide.' With only eleven countries earning an overall
score above seventy, the vast majority of countries exhibit serious
shortcomings in resource governance. 41 These statistics bolster Auty's
3s Richard Damania & Erwin Bulte, Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural
Resource Curse 5 (Center For International Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 0320, 2003),
available at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/publications/19932003/.
3 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5398, 1997), available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/wamer 
.files/natresf5.pdf, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner,
The Curse oflNatural Resources, 45 European Econ. Review 827, 827 (2001); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew
M. Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth, 59 JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 43, 43 (1999); Richard Damania & Erwin Bulte, supra note 35.
37 RICHARD M. AurY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE
RESOURCE CURSE THESIS 1, 5,241 (1993).
3 See About NRGI, NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, http://www.
resourcegovemance.org/about (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
" The 2013 Resource Governance Index, REVENUE WATCH INSTITUTE, http://www.
resourcegovemance.org/sites/default/files/rgi_2013_Eng.pdf [hereinafter RGl] (last visited Oct. 18,
2014).
4 Id.
41 Id.
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findings regarding the resource curse.42
The "resource curse" is an interrelated set of social and economic
pathologies that often frustrate resource-rich countries. Paradoxically,
countries with abundant natural resources tend to have less sustainable
development and economic growth than countries with fewer natural
resources. In particular, the resource curse highlights an inverse relationship
between natural resource abundance and economic growth, good governance,
and political stability.43 In essence, countries with abundant natural resources
tend to have more internal conflicts than countries with fewer natural
resources."
Economists believe the resource curse afflicts poor countries with vast
natural resource deposits because of their corrupt and authoritarian
governments and ineffective laws. 45 While reviewing the existing literature
on the resource curse and its affect on economic growth, Richard Damania
and Erwin Bulte found that the resource curse results from the relationships
between extractive industries and corrupt governance.' This research led
Dalmania and Bulte to posit that natural resources allow governments in
autocratic regimes to effect greater bribes from natural resource companies
through policies that are detrimental to growth, such as stalling the
economy's transition to competitive development and diversification 47 . As a
result, natural resource-rich countries with self-interested leadership, weak
institutional capacities, and wrong and cynical policies, continually fall into
42 Daniel M. Firger, Transparency And The Natural Resource Curse: Examining The New
Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 1043, 1051 (2010).
" Id. at 1052; see Peter Eigen, A Coalition to Combat Corruption: T, EITI, and Civil Society, in
CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) [hereinafter
Eigen, Coalition]; Weidner, supra note 25, at 236; Ivar Kolstad, The Resource Curse: Which Institutions
Matter? 1 (Chr. Michelsen Institute, Working Paper No. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2678-the-resource-curse-which-institutions-matter.pdf.
" Michael Ross, How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?AMedium-NAnalysis, 11 (UCLA
Dept. of Political Science, 2003), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu
/polisci/faculty/ross/HowDoesNat.pd, Paivi Lujala, The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel
Access to Natural Resources, 47(1) J. PEACE RESEARCH 15, 16 (2010); Philippe Le Billon, The Political
Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 561, 563-566 (2001);
Mehlum et al., supra note 31; Goldstein, supra note 32.
s S. Scott Gaille, Mitigating the Resource Curse: A Proposal for a Microfinance and Educational
Lending Royalty Law, 32 ENERGY LJ. 81, 84 (2011) [hereinafter Gaille]; Mehlum et al., supra note 31,
at 1127.
' Damania & Bulte, supra note 35, at 10.
47 id.
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the resource curse.48
B. The Experiences ofNigeria and Botswana
Nigeria, a West African country with a population of over 174 million,
is well known for its huge natural gas and oil deposits, among other natural
resources. 49 It is one of the largest oil producers in the world, with production
capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day.50 The Nigerian oil industry has
accounted for about 80% of the country's fiscal revenues, 90-95% of its export
revenues, and 35% of its total Gross Domestic Product (GDP).si Although
Nigeria has earned tremendous amounts of money from natural resource
production, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world. 52 Poverty
has grown at an alarming rate, increasing from 28% of the population in
1980, to 46% percent in 1985, to 66% in 1996. s Between 1970 and 1999,
Nigeria earned around $320 billion from crude oil exports, enough to
transform the country's living conditions and economy into one of the best
in the world.54 Thus, the high poverty rate and slow economic growth
suggests that the resource curse is at work in Nigeria.
Meanwhile, Botswana, a landlocked country in Southern Africa and
home to over two million people, is one of the richest and most developed
countries in Africa.55 The country's economic success is mainly driven by
natural resources, particularly diamonds. In fact, Botswana is the biggest
48 Id.
49 The World Factbook Nigeria, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.htil (last visited May 11, 2013).
50 Nigeria: Country Analysis Brief Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 30, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ni EITI, Nigeria, EXTRACTIVE INDUS.
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
http://eiti.org/Nigeria (last visited May 29, 2013); KEBLUSEK, supra note 24, at 9.
si Nigeria, EXTRACTVE INDUS.'TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
http://eiti.org/Nigeria (last visited May 29, 2013); KEBLUSEK, supra note 24, at 9.
52 Nigeria: Poverty in the Midst of Plenty, The Challenge of Growth with Inclusion, THE WORLD
BANK, No. 14733-UNI, (May 31, 1996), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org
/servlet/WDSContentServer/VDSP/IB/1996/05/31/000009265_3961029235646/Rendered/PDF/mul
ti0page.pdf.
53 Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Coiporations, and the Resource Curse in
Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 23 (2005) [hereinafter Duruigbo, World Bank]; Siri Aas Rustad,
Piivi Lujala & Philippe Le Billon, Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from the Management ofHigh-Value
Natural Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEws &ANALYSIS 10546,10552 (2012).
s' Duruigbo, World Bank, supra note 53, at 23.
s The World Factbook.- Botswana, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov
/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (last visited May 11, 2013).
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diamond producer of the world.s6 Botswana has directly benefited from its
extractive diamond industry, which has transformed it from one of the
poorest into one of the wealthiest countries in Africa.57 As such, the country
has been celebrated for effectively avoiding the resource curse.58
Since the discovery of diamonds, Botswana has demonstrated that the
resource curse is not inevitable.5 ' Through strong leadership and committed
political will, Botswana established sound fiscal policies to ensure economic
prosperity and avoid the squandering of its diamond wealth. The country's
leadership worked to ensure that it had utilized the wealth afforded by its
natural resources wisely. For example, it increased domestic investments by
inviting foreign corporations to invest in its diamond industry and improved
management of state enterprises by handling natural resource contract
dealings responsibly.6 0
Furthermore, Botswana's institutional foundation, including its laws
and codes, is a shining example to other countries wishing to substantially
profit from mineral resources. Botswana's Mines and Mineral Act of 1990 is
not only focused and transparent law, but also furthers broad political
participation by vesting mineral rights in the Republic, subject to other
provisions.6 ' It further contains clear criteria for official decision-making, as
well as clear criteria for evaluating costs and benefits to evaluate projects for
potential investors. 62
Finally, Botswana's mining licensing procedures are simple, which
makes Botswana's regulations friendlier to investors. Interested companies
56 Kori Kelley, Are Mined Diamonds Forever? The Emergence ofLab Diamonds and the Suppression of
Conflict Diamonds, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 451,467 (2008).
57 Id. at 461.
s Nicholas Olmsted, Indigenous Rights in Botswana: Development, Democracy, and Dispossession, 3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 799,800 (2004).
s Paul Collier, Law and Codes for the Resource Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9, 11-12
(2008).
o Amelia Cook &Jeremy Sarkin, Is Botswana the Miracle ofAfrica? Democracy, the Rule ofLaw, and
Human Rights Versus Economic Development, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 463-64
(2010).
6 Mines and Minerals Act of 1999, Act No. 17 § 3 (Bots.), available at
http://www.mines.gov.bw/mines%20and%20minerals%20%2OAct.pdf; Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent
Sovereignty and People's Ownership ofNatural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 33, 91 (2006) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty].
6 M. Jonathan Robb Jr., A Diamonds Wealth Is Forever: Comparing Zimbabwe's and Botswana's
Diamond Mining Laws Reveal Changes That Zimbabwe Should Implement, 29 Wis. INT'L L.J. 642, 661
(2011).
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begin by identifying a piece of land and consulting with the Department of
Geological Survey. 63 Next, the company must apply for a prospecting license.
64 The requirements for completing a prospecting license are the following:
(a) the applicant is financially and technically equipped and has the
experience to carry out the proposed operation;
(b) the applicant has proposed and adequate operation and made
proper provision for environmental protection;
(c) the area proposed for extraction does not infringe on an existing
extracting area; and
(d) the applicant is not in default.s
Under the Mines and Mineral Act, the Minister has the authority necessary
to verify these requirements."
In contrast, since the discovery of its oil reserves, Nigeria has
experienced high poverty alongside steady economic growth. 67 Unlike
Botswana, Nigeria is home to warring tribes, high illiteracy, and brutal
warlords. 6' The officials responsible for overseeing Nigeria's natural resource
projects have squandered much of the country's natural resource revenues.69
As a result of corruption, unaccountability, and weak institutional capacity to
manage revenue flows and expenditures, Nigeria has failed to allocate it
natural resources effectively.70
Nigeria has consistently ranked low in Transparency International's (TI)
Corruption Perceptions Index. TI is a non-governmental organization that
publishes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) every year. The TI
measures the level of corruption in more than 170 countries.71 As one of the
61 Id. at 661-62.
' Mines and Minerals Act of 1999, supra note 61.
65 Id.
66 Id67 Nigeria: Poverty in the Midst ofPlenty, supra note 52.
61 See Ermeka Duruigbo, The GlobalEnergy Challenge andNigeria's EmergenceAs a Major Gas Power:
Promise, Peril Or Paradox of Plenty, 21 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 423-24 (2009) [hereinafter
Duruigbo, GlohalEnergy Challenge].6 1 d. at 425.
'0 See id. at 427-28.
n Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2014), available at
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2Ol3/results/.
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most corrupt countries in Africa, Nigeria loses nearly 40% of its wealth to
corruption and government mismanagement. 72 Corruption prevents
revenues from flowing from the extractive industries to the state, and
ultimately, from the state to subnational entities or development projects,
resulting in steady economic growth and increase in poverty.73
Nigeria's corruption remains the most serious impediment to dealing
with its resource curse.74 Because of its weak institutional structure, Nigeria
is slowly becoming a rentier state. Rentier states depend on external rents
derived from the export of natural resources or an influx of foreign aid,
instead of the domestic productivity of its citizens. 7s Since the Nigerian
government collects little to no taxes from its citizen, there remain few
incentives and political will for the government to be responsive to the
citizens' needs.76 Accordingly, Nigeria's failure appears to stem from the
following: (1) natural resource revenues benefit corrupt politicians; (2) the
country's institutions range from weak to dysfunctional; and (3), unlike
Botswana, Nigeria lacks a natural resource policy to deal with wealth
distribution.
While Nigeria has a long way to go before corruption is eradicated in its
natural resource industry, it has taken steps forward, including attaining
compliant status of the EITI and adhering with the EITI's reporting
procedures to curb the resource curse.7 1 In compliance with the EITI,
Nigeria has been disclosing its oil revenues. Nigeria EITI's second report,
which identified unprecedented financial discrepancies, underreported taxes,
and system inefficiencies, is a good indicator that the country is working its
way toward transparency 7  The report identified over $800 million in
n Reagan R. Demas, Moment of The Truth: Development in Sub-Saharan Africa and Critical
Alterations Needed In Application of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and OtherAnti-Corruption Initiatives,
26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 315,321 (2011).
n Duruigbo, Global Energy Challenge, supra note 68, at 426; see also Demas, supra note 72, at 321.
" Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 61, at 91.
7s Duruigbo, Global Energy Challenge, supra note 68, at 424.
76 Resource Curse or Blessing? Africa's Management of Its Extractive Industries: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Afr. Affairs of S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110 Cong. 713, 8 (Sept. 24, 2008) available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg47003/htmVICHRG-110shrg47003.htm; Duruigbo,
Global Energy Challenge, supra note 68, at 425.
7 EITI, Nigeria EITY Making Transparency Count, Uncovering Billions, Case Study, EXTRACTIVE
INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 1 (2012) [hereinafter Nigeria Case Study],
http://eiti.org/files/Case%20Study%20-%20EITI%20in%20Nigeria.pdf.
7 1 Id. at 2.
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discrepancies between what companies said they paid in taxes, royalties, and
signature bonuses and what the government said it received.79 According to
a case study by the EITI on Nigeria, this report provided an opportunity for
the citizens to scrutinize their government. The case study announced that
after the publication of the report, Nigerian citizens wanted to hold their
officials accountable for the discrepancies in the natural resource revenue
management, indicating a desire for transparency and accountability.80
Botswana, on the other hand, is not an EITI compliant member, but it
has adhered to the general principles of the EITI and enjoyed a great deal of
economic growth and transparency in its natural resource industry. In the
past, Botswana was reluctant to formally join the EITI, likely because of the
historical secrecy associated with the diamond industry and the desire to
avoid giving away confidential commercial information to competitors.
Nevertheless, in 2007, the government of Botswana announced that it would
join the EITI to prove its commitment to transparency and boost its economy
by inviting more foreign investors to invest in the diamond industry.8'
C. Lessons forAfghanistan
The exploration of natural resources in Afghanistan will increase the risk
of mismanagement and corruption.8 2 Unfortunately, Afghanistan faces more
or less the same hurdles as Nigeria, because of its mere veneer of democracy,
constant violence, and prevalent poverty. Resource extraction in Nigeria's
case is linked with lack of political will to commit to transparency. Likewise,
the Afghan elites may want to keep control of the resources, ultimately using
the revenues from foreign buyers to enrich themselves and their allies.8 ' Both
countries are home to vast natural resource deposits, warring tribes, illiterate
populations, corrupt governments, and brutal warlords. Both also have
histories of conflict and have experienced the perverse effects of mineral
79 id
" Collier, supra note 59, at 18.
s' EITI, Advancing the EITI in the Mining Sector: A Consultation With Stakeholders, UN
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 76-77 (Christopher Eads, et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://eiti.org/files/MINING%20Compressed.pdf.
82 KOcHAN & GOODYEAR, supra note 25, at 4-5.
" Goldstein, supra note 32.
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wealth: less democracy, more inequality, more war, and more corruption. 84
Both countries rely on foreign aid and have tenuous legal structures to address
these challenges.85
In 2013, Revenue Watch Institute's RGI gave Afghanistan a "failing"
grade of thirty-three, ranking 49th out of fifty-eight countries." The RGI
ranks countries based on their institutional and legal foundations, reporting
practices, safeguards and quality controls, and enabling environment." As
such, this ranking suggests that Afghanistan has poor reporting practices,
lacks pertinent experience, a limited or weak institutional capacity, and
ineffective laws. " The following section explores the accuracy of these
characterizations.
1. Weak Institutional Capacity
Institutional performance can predict the diverging impact of natural
resources on economic development across countries and can determine
whether a country will be blessed or cursed by its resource wealth. Unlike
Botswana, Nigeria and Afghanistan have poor institutional performance.8 9
Botswana ranks as one of the least corrupt countries in Africa on the
Transparency's CPI, whereas warlord-dominated Nigeria and Afghanistan
rank amongst the most corrupt countries in the world.90
The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) is currently
the sole agency for combatting corruption and bringing transparency to
Afghanistan. The HOO was established in 2008 as an independent anti-
corruption body and the highest authority of the Afghan government to
coordinate and oversee the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption
Strategy.91 HOO's sole purpose is to fight corruption and bring transparency
" Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Next for Afghanistan, the Curse of Plenty?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2010)
(revised for correction July 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/weekinreview
/20mcneil.html?emc=etal&_r=1&.
1s ASTRI SUHRKE, WHEN MORE IS LEss 12 (2011).
" RGI, supra note 39, at 9.
7 Id. at 6.
" Id. at 9.
89 Id.
' Mehlum et al., supra note 31, at 1118-19.
91 Anti-Corruption Strategic Plan 2011-2013, HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND ANTI-
CORRUPTION, 7 (December 27, 2010), available at https://www.pksoi.org/document-repository
/doclib/hooanti-corruption-strategic-plan_2011- 2 013 .pdf
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to the government through the development of policy. However, the HOO
is coping with many challenges in implementing its strategies. Namely,
Afghans generally distrust HOO's performance; it struggles with an
insufficient work force and low institutional capacity, and lacks the backing
and commitment of Afghanistan's political elites. 92 It has also been
hamstrung by investigative work and inadequate cooperation among Afghan
governmental offices. As a consequence, the HOO can neither monitor the
contracts and revenues in the mining sector, nor come up with any new ideas
to confront corruption in extractive industries.9 3
To complicate the Afghan situation further, the natural resource boom
has had destructive effects on existing institutions and impeded the
development of new development. Specifically, it has overwhelmed
bureaucracies and fiscal institutions, causing state institutions to take on
responsibilities that exceed their capacity, and has provided more opportunity
for political leaders to misuse windfall gains and seize resource rents.9
To examine the relationship between natural resources and conflict and
how corruption and weak institutions precipitate the resource curse, Renard
Sexton did seven case studies in Afghanistan.95 He found a dose relationship
between corruption, weak institutions, and the resource curse in two of his
case studies. Specifically, in Kunar and Badakhshan Provinces, the flow of
cash through weak and corrupt local institutions and their control were the
driving motive for extraction of natural resources." In Badakhshan, the links
between a member of Parliament and the Afghan President's inner circle
allowed corrupt political officials to trade natural resources for personal and
political gains." Meanwhile, in Kunar, local officials have used political
connections in Kabul to eliminate rivals in the extractive trade.9 8
92 See JOHN HEIBRUNN, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Legitimacy and Anti-Corruption
Commisssions," in CORRUPTION AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: SELLING THE PEACE?
(Christine S. Cheng & Dominik Zaum eds., 2012).
93 d.
" Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 61, at 86-87.
s Renard Sexton, Natural Resources and Conflict in Afghanistan: Seven Case Studies, Major Trends
and Implications for the Transition, AFGHANISTAN WATCH (July 2012),
http://www.watchafghanistan.org/files/NaturalResourcesand-Conflict-inAfghanistan/NaturaLReso
urcesandConflictinAfghanistanullReportEnglish.pdf.
96 Id. at 7.
9 Id.
98 d
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2. Lack ofExperience
Unlike Botswana, which began extracting natural resources after its
independence in 1966, Afghanistan has suffered from decades of war, and
the exploration of natural resources is a new enterprise for the government.
Despite the fact that Afghans have engaged in small-scale mining for
centuries,99 few minerals have been exploited. This is due in part to the
country's week infrastructure, which is rudimentary at best. Only one
national highway connects the north to the south, and Taliban bombs are a
frequent threat along many of the country's ramshackle roads. 00
The history of modern resource extraction in Afghanistan is linked to
Soviet Occupation. Decades ago, Soviet scientists discovered that the soils of
Afghanistan contained ample mineral resources."o' The Soviet explorations
indicated that Afghanistan was extremely rich in various types of ores.102
However, due to ongoing hostilities during the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the Soviet plan to develop Afghanistan's mineral deposits for
export to the USSR was severely hampered and eventually cut off. 103 By the
mid-1990s, there was little mineral, oil, or gas extraction due to civil war, and
later, the rule of the Taliban regime.104
Foreign industry experts caution that it will take many years and billions
of dollars to build basic infrastructures, including power plants, railway lines,
and other needed facilities to extract and transport commodities from the
country's mountainous terrain."os As such, it may take years for Afghanistan
to have sufficiently large commercial operations.
Considering its destroyed infrastructures and the inability of the Afghan
" Id.; Alexandra Zavis, Excavating a Future in Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/world/la-fg-afghanistan-mines-20130324.
10o See USAID, SHEBERGHAN GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: RISK ANALYSIS REPORT
27 (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.afghaneic.com/Sheberghan%2OFiles/AEAI%20-
%20SGFDP%20--%2ORisk%20Analysis%20Report.pdf; ABC, supra note 6.
101 Malishevski, supra note 3; Risen, supra note 4.
102 id
lo3 NATHAN &BERGER'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; see also Malishevski, supra note 3.
104 Risen, supra note 4.
"o ( Rustad et al., supra note 53, at 10546 (discussing the extraordinary difficulties in assessing
the value and appropriate management of high-value natural resources in post-conflict and conflict-
affected countries).
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government to carry out explorations on its own, mining companies have
been hesitant to invest in mining operations in Afghanistan.106 The Afghan
government needs experience and much more ground exploration, including
drilling, to verify and confirm that there are viable deposits that can be
exploited.'07
3. Ineffective Laws
In managing natural resources and their revenues, the establishment of
sound institutions requires legal reform. Such reform requires local laws to
consider objectives, standards, procedures, and institutions that govern the
management of the resource base, revenue flows, and expenditures when
addressing high-value resources.1os Such laws may also reach beyond local
boundaries and incorporate international voluntary standards. Nigeria, before
achieving compliant status, completely changed its laws and codes dealing
with natural resource extraction. In 2007, the Nigerian National Assembly
passed into law the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act,
which initiated two legally binding reporting requirements: (1) all extractives
companies had to report payments made, and (2) the government had to
report all revenues received.' 09 This action was a step towards transparency,
ensuring accountability in the use of billions of dollars in revenue every year
from the extractive industries.
Unfortunately, Afghanistan has been hesitant to address the issue of
transparency in its natural resources laws. The two primary laws dealing with
natural resource extraction in Afghanistan are the Minerals Law of 2010 and
the Hydrocarbon Law of 2006. 110 These laws are not in line with
international industry standards because they lack clear provisions addressing
transparency, disclosure of contracts, participation of civil society, and
106 McNeil, supra note 84.
107 Sengupta, supra note 20.
'0 Rustad et al., supra note 53, at 10557.
Nigeria Case Study, supra note 77, at 1.
no The Minerals Law of Afghanistan (Feb. 14, 2010) (Afg.) (unofficial English translation)
[hereinafter Minerals Law], arts. 25-37, available at http://www.aisa.org.af/law/minerals/Mineral-
Law.pdf; The Hydrocarbon Regulations ofAfghanistan (Jan. 2009) (Afg.) (unofficial English translation)
[hereinafter Hydrocarbon Law], available at http://www.aisa.org.af/law/minerals/The-Hydrocarbon-
Regulations.pdf.
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involvement of local communities in the extraction process. 11' The laws'
complicated licensing procedures, which do not adequately protect the rights
of investors, further discourages investment in the natural resource extraction
industry.n 2
Notably, the three anti-corruption laws and anti-corruption strategies
currently in force in Afghanistan have not succeeded in fostering
transparency. These laws and strategies include the following: the UN
Convention Against Corruption,113 the Law on Campaign against Bribery
and Administrative Corruption, 114 the Law on Supervision and
Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1s and National Anti-
Corruption Strategy (2008).H6 Unlike Botswana's Mines and Mineral Act of
1990, which is a focused document resulting in transparent management of
revenues; the Afghan laws address administrative corruption and bribery in
the government sector only.117 The laws do not mention transparency clauses
in contracts or identify any related red flags or corruption risk.18
As a result, a number of challenges, including acquiring the required
technologies, maximizing administrative and managerial capacities, finding
the political will among the leaders of the country, codifying new and
effective laws, providing better security for extraction, and most importantly,
purging the government of its crippling corruption, make it difficult for
Afghanistan to avoid the resource curse. These are profoundly formidable
n. Sean Carberry, Afghan Mineral Treasures Stay Buried, Hostages to Uncertainty, NPR (May 18,
2013, 5:13 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/05/18/184775139/Afghan-Mineral-
Treasures-Stay-Buried-Hostage-To-Uncertainty.
112 CHIN S. Kuo, 2010 MINERALS YEARBOOK: THE MINERAL INDUSTRY OF AFGHANISTAN,
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 2.1 (Aug. 2012).
113 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, openedfor signature, 2349 U.N.T.S. 145 (Oct.
31, 2003).
n4 Law on the Campaign Against Bribery and'Administrative Corruption, Official Gazette No. 383
(July 2004) (Afg.) (unofficial English translation), available at http://www.aisa.org.af/olaws
/838%20Anti%20Bribery%20Campaign.doc.
" Law on Supervision and Implementation ofAnti-Corruption Strategies, Official Gazette No. 957
(Sept. 2008) (Afg.) (unofficial English translation), available at http://anti-
corruption.gov.af/Content/files/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%86%20%D9%8
8%20%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%Bl%D8%A7%D8%AADB%8C%DA%98%DB%8C%20%D9%87%
D8%A7/HoO%2OLaw%20English%20version%201.pdf.
116 Anti-Corruption Sector National Strategy (2008-2013), in Afghanistan Nat'l Dev. Strategy
(2008), available at http://mfa.gov.af/Content/filesNolume%205%20ENG.pdf.
n1 See Robb, supra note 62, at 661.
us See generally Sandra S. Nichols et al., When Peacebuilding Meets the Plan: Natural Resource
Governance andPost-Conflict Recovery, 12 WHITEHEADJ. DIPL. &INT'L REL. 11, 17 (2011) (stating that
transparency is a worthy goal but difficult to achieve).
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challenges that few believe the Afghan government can overcome any time
soon."' These challenges have also caused policy makers in Afghanistan to
question the effectiveness of the EITI in promoting transparency in a very
corrupt government.
The level of corruption in the Afghan government, however, is not the
subject of this article. Rather, this article questions whether, with corruption
prevalent in the government apparatus, Afghanistan can attain EITI
membership in order to boost revenues from its natural resource extraction.
This question is especially important today. Foreign troops are on their way
out of Afghanistan, and the country is in desperate need of a self-sustaining
economic mechanism to help it rely less on donation and more on its own
income generation.120
III. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE RESOURCE CURSE IN AFGHANISTAN
Any effort to address the resource curse in Afghanistan must be
transnational in scope because only then will the Afghan government act
against corruption. Afghanistan ranks as one of three most corrupt countries
in the world.12' Rent-seeking behavior is pervasive and political elites control
the state apparatus. 122 Large-scale corruption, which is common in
Afghanistan, tends to be correlated with natural resources such as oil,
minerals, and gems. These sources are more prone to corruption because they
are extracted from areas where government actors have control over natural
resources.123
For example, in the Badakhshan and Kunar Provinces, the politicians
use their affiliations with the central government to control the extraction
and export of minerals.'2 4 These natural resources typically involve capital-
intensive processing facilities that require governmental participation or
119 Mehdi Rezaie, Afghanistan's "Resource Curse"Problem, DAILY OUTLOOK AFGHANISTAN (Feb.
28, 2013), http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?postjid=6738.
120 See Liz Chong, Afghanistan Warned on Resource Curse, EMERGING MARKETS (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2689873/Afghanistan-wamed-on-resource-curse.html.
121 See Corruption Perception Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2013), available at http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2013/results.
122 See Kolstad, supra note 43, at 4 (discussing rent-seeking models' prevalence).
12 Firger, supra note 42, at 1056-57.
124 Sexton, supra note 95, at 7.
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permission, and they are usually subject to state control rather than private
ownership. 125 Therefore, in Afghanistan, where influential politicians
control state institutions, revenues from natural resource extractions and
exports can be misappropriated more easily for private gain. Purely domestic
responses to misappropriation will likely fall short.
Accordingly, any serious efforts to avoid the resource curse in
Afghanistan must include measures that are transnational in scope.126 These
efforts must meet the high expectations of a combination of local, national,
and international stakeholders. To meet these expectations, Afghanistan
needs leadership that is more effective, appropriate economic, financial,
social, environmental, and institutional strength, technical capacity, and a
structured means of accountability. 12 7
To foster accountability, Afghanistan must engage with a wide range of
stakeholders outside of the resource extracting companies, namely: civil
society, community representatives, professional associations, think tanks,
parliaments, and the media. 12s To best achieve this goal, Afghanistan must
follow the EITI principles.129
As part of its efforts to address the resource curse, Afghanistan is
focusing on implementation of the EITI principles. 130 The EITI is
transnational in scope and gives special importance in transparency as the key
to avoiding the resource curse. To this end, this section will focus on the
EITI and where the Afghan government stands today in its commitment to
comply with the EITI.
D. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
1. Goals
125 Minerals Law, supra note 110; Hydrocarbon Law, supra note 110.
126 Firger, supra note 42, at 1059.
1' See Deval Desai & Michael Jarvis, Governance and Accountability in Extractive Industries: Theory
and Practice at the World Bank, 30 No. 2 J. ENERGY &NAT. RESOURCES L. 101, 102 (2012).
128 see id.
129 See Afghanistan, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org
/Afghanistan (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
1 Christine Clough, Using Transparency to Avoid The Resource Curse in Afghanistan, FINANCIAL
TRANPARENCY COAL. (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-
transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/.
131 Id.
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With the widespread recognition that natural resource extraction could
be either a blessing or a curse, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank
have attempted to strengthen public financial management in client countries
for many years.' 32 As part of that effort and with further support from the
International Monetary Fund and the UK government, the EITI was
launched in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg with the goal of combatting the resource curse. 13 It was
created to provide a pathway to better management of oil, gas, and mineral
resources for the benefit of a country's people.' 34 The EITI is a coalition of
governments, companies, civil society groups, and international
organizations that promote greater transparency to prevent corruption in the
management of natural resource revenues.13 It leverages such revenues to
support growth and development in resource-rich countries. The EITI is
designed to promote the data collection on company payments to host
governments and government receipts from companies in the extractive
industries to strengthen accountability. 3 6 The goal is to identify potential
discrepancies between payments and receipts and investigate and address the
underlying causes. Governments that implement the initiative are obliged to
establish national, multi-stakeholder groups.' 3 ' These members of these
groups, coming from the government, foreign and domestic companies, and
civil society, jointly ensure that data on financial flows is properly
consolidated, matched, audited, and published. 3 8
Before establishing the EITI, natural resource revenues were typically
kept confidential by host governments, allowing corruption among both
132 Peter Eigen, Fighting Corruption in a GlobalEconomy: Transparency Initiatives in the Oil and Gas
Industry, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 327, 333 (2007).13 EITI INT'L ADVISORY GRP., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP9 (2006)
[hereinafter Advisory Group Report], available at http://eiti.org/files/docunent/eiti
iag-reportsenglish.pdf.
134 EI, IMPLEME1N4TING EI FOR IMPACI: A HANDBOOK FOR POLIcY MAKERS AND
STAKEHOLDERS 12 (Anwar Ravat & Sridar P. Kannan eds., 2012), available at http//siteresources.
worldbankorg/INTEXTIDTRAINI/Resources/ET Handbook_2012.pdf [hereinafter EI Handbook
2009]; see Weidner, supra note 25, at 236.
13s Advisory Group Report, supra note 133, at 9; see Desai &Jarvis, supra note 127, at 118.
136 Weidner, supra note 25, at 238.
137 Eigen, Coalition, supra note 43, at 425.
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government officials and multinational firms.' With support from the
World Bank and a related project known as "Publish What You Pay," the
EITI process was deemed successful in lifting the veil on the financial
transactions that underlie resource extraction projects in countries like
Nigeria.140
2. Principles and Criteria
EITI is driven by the idea that transparency can alter incentives and
change behavior. Its framework is built upon a foundation of twelve
principles related to transparency, government accountability, sustainable
economic growth, and national sovereignty.14 ' The basic principles include
(1) independent verification of payments and receipts; (2) an independent
involvement of civil society in the process, not exclusive government control;
and (3) voluntary participation by governments. However, once a country
endorses the initiative, all extractive industry producers operating in that
country are expected to participate.14 2
To ensure that the governments implementing the EITI comply with
these principles, the EITI has designed six criteria that member countries
must meet. These criteria include:
1. Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining
payments by companies to governments ("payments") and all
material revenues received by governments from oil, gas and
mining companies ("revenues") to a wide audience in a publicly
accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner.
2. Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues
are the subject of a credible, independent audit, applying
international auditing standards.
a' Collier, supra note 59, at 17.
'
4 0Weidner, supra note 25, at 236.
14 EITI Rules, 2011 Edition, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 1, 11, (Nov. 1,
2011) (hereinafter EITI Rules], available at http://eiti.org/files/2011-11-01_2011_EITIRULES.pdf;
Advisory Group Report, supra note 133; Firger, supra note 42, at 1063-67.
142 See generally EITI Rules, supra note 133, at 12; KEBLUSEK, supra note 24, at 9.
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3. Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible,
independent administrator, applying international auditing
standards and with publication of the administrator's opinion
regarding that reconciliation including discrepancies, should
any be identified.
4. This approach is extended to all companies including state-
owned enterprises.
5. Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design,
monitoring, and evaluation of this process and contributes
towards public debate.
6. A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is
developed by the host government, with assistance from the
international financial institutions where required, including
measurable targets, a timetable for implementation, and an
assessment of potential capacity constraints. 143
The principles and criteria together established a clear, broad, and
pragmatic platform that attracted the participation of dozens of resource-rich
states. The EITI further garnered the support of many resource extraction
companies and developed a country-based governance structure with a
twenty-member board and a secretary. It also has adopted rules and criteria
for the validation of "Candidate" and "Compliant" countries, and it uses
accredited private party "validators" to certify a country's implementation
process.'" The EITI process is carried out by an independent administrator
and conducted under the supervision of a steering committee. The
administrator's job is to produce a public report with revenue and payment
data and an explanation of data discrepancies and process shortcomings.145
3. Membership Process
143 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 11.
1" Firger, supra note 42, at 1066.
4s EITI Guide for Legislators: How to Support and Strengthen Resource Transparency, EXTRACTIVE
INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 15 (May 25, 2009), [hereinafter EITI Guide for Legislators],
http://eiti.org/files/MPEITIGuide.pdf.
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(a) Candidate Status
To become a "Candidate," a country must publicly state its intentions;
it must commit to work with civil society and companies; it must designate a
senior individual to lead the EITI implementation; it must create a multi-
stakeholder steering committee (MSG) consisting of government officials,
companies, and members of civil society to observe the implementation of
the EITI; and it must create a Work Plan containing measurable targets and
a timetable for implementation of the EITI. ' Furthermore, the EITI
requires that extractive companies operating within its territory report the
payments they make to the government.14 7 The governments must publicly
report their receipt of such payments in order to reconcile any disparities.148
The above steps are called "sign-up" steps.14 Vhen a country has completed
the "sign-up" steps and wishes to be recognized as an EITI Candidate
Country, the government, with the support of the MSG, must formally
submit a Candidate Application to the EITI Chair. 150After meeting the
requirements and successful completion of the application, the country is
designated as an EITI "Candidate Country" by the EITI Board and is listed
as such on the EITI website.1st
(b) Compliant Status
To achieve the EITI Compliant status, a country must complete
an EITI "Validation Process." 5 2 Validation is an essential element of the
EITI global standard. Validation serves two critical functions. First, it
promotes dialogue among the MSG members and it fosters learning within
the country. Second, it safeguards the EITI principles by holding all EITI
implementing countries to the same standard. In other words, it provides an
independent, objective assessment of the progress achieved and identifies
14 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13; EITI Handbook 2009, supra note 134, at 25.
147 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 11.
14 Firger, supra note 42, at 1066.
14 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 15.
1o Id.
1s1 Id. at 15.
'
52 Id. at 32.
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what measures are needed to strengthen the EITI process.1s' It further
assesses whether Candidate Countries have implemented the EITI
successfully and have met all the "EITI Requirements." 15 4 The Validation
Process distinguishes the difference between those countries that have
endorsed the EITI and are in the process of implementing it, and those
countries that have fully implemented the EITI.ss Successfully undergoing
the Validation Process indicates that the Candidate Country has met an
internationally agreed upon standard of transparency and accountability.'s
Upon successful completion of the Validation Process, Candidate Countries
become designated as "Compliant Countries".'s
The Candidate Country is required to achieve compliant status. The
Candidate Country must submit its first "EITI Report" within 18 months of
candidacy, subsequently producing an annual EITI report.'58 Moreover, the
Candidate Country is required to submit its first Validation Report within
two-and-a-half years of achieving candidacy.'59 The goal of the Validation
Report is to verify whether the various EITI requirements have been
satisfactorily fulfilled.' 60 A Candidate Country can be delisted if it does not
adhere to the deadlines mentioned above.' 1 However, a Candidate Country
can extend the EITI report and validation report deadlines with approval of
the MSG in advance of the respective deadlines.'62 The discretion to grant
the extension is with the EITI board; progress towards implementation of
the requirements is strongly considered when granting deadline
extensions."' Maximum extension for a Candidate Country's deadline is 3
years and 6 months.164 As of January 30, 2014, the EITI had 25 compliant
members and 16 Candidate Countries waiting to be validated for compliant
status.
65
153id
154 Id. at 34; Weidner, supra note 25, at 239.
155 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 34-40.
156 EITI Handbook 2009, supra note 134, at 83.
17 Id. at 83-84.
' Id. at 84.159 id.
160 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 34.
161 Id. at 41.
162 id.
163 
-d
64 Id. at 61.
165 EITI, EITI Countries, EXTRACTVE INDUSTRIEs TRANSPARENcy INITIATIVE,
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(c) Maintaining Compliant Status
Achieving compliant status does not guarantee permanent membership
in the EITI. The Compliant Countries must continue their commitment to
the EITI.' 66 Validation and compliant status last five years.16 7 Afterwards,
participants are required to go through another validation.' 68 The MSG may
ask for validation at any time through formal submission of a request to the
EITI Board.' 6 The EITI Board, based on the Compliant Country's merits,
will then decide whether to grant an early validation or not.170 Nevertheless,
a Compliant member is required, at all times, to regularly publish and publicly
disclose its annual report, which must be endorsed by the MSG.'7 1 The report
must include essential information such as the country's progress in
implementing the EITI and steps towards remedying their weaknesses. 172
Failure to do so may prevent early validation or result in delisting.173
2. Benefits and Drawbacks of the EITI
The primary reason for a country to commit to the EITI standards is
that "it ensures [that] a greater portion of revenues generated from oil and
mineral resources are used to benefit the people in a nation."174 The EITI
can serve as a powerful tool for citizens and legislators to understand their
governments' revenues and how their government chooses to spend those
revenues, thus strengthen budget monitoring and oversight.175 The EITI
can reinforce broader anti-corruption and good governance agendas through
programs that can make corrupt practices more difficult to hide.17 6 It also
http://eiti.org/countries (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
"n EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 30.167Id
168 id.
169 id.
170 Id. at 31.
171 id
172 EITI Handbook 2009, supra note 134, at 84-85.
173 Id.
1 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 30.
s EITI Guidefor Legislators, supra note 145, at 16.
' Firger, supra note 42, at 1063-67; see EITI Guidefor Legislators, supra note 145, at 16.
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intends to build citizen trust in public institutions by providing the dialogue
opportunities between elected officials in public discussion about how the
government receives and spends revenues.1 77 This way, "citizens may feel
empowered and better connected to the policy process."78.
The EITI implementation process also leads to a wide range of benefits
to the MSG. With their commitment to the EITI, Compliant Countries
can benefit from following an internationally recognized transparency
standard, leading to improvements in tax collection and enhanced trust and
stability in the extractive industries sector.179 Companies will also benefit
from a level playing field in which all companies are required to disclose the
same information, as well as a more stable investment climate in which they
can engage with citizens. "s Civil society will have reliable information and
can better hold both the government and companies accountable. In general,
the EITI increases long-term stability and investment."
Nevertheless, the EITI has been criticized for its lenient principles and
criteria. While voluntary and unenforceable positioning may have its merits,
it is also a source of inadequacy."' It increases the chances of a "free rider"
situation where those corporations that are not willing to make necessary
efforts to reform their practices will, nevertheless, benefit from a transparent
business environment provided by their peers.183
Critics also assert that revenue reporting by governments is not required
on a company-by-company basis, and most countries participating in the
EITI have chosen to report only one combined annual figure. 184 The
disjunction between the aggregate amounts listed by governments and the
figures reported by individual firms creates uncertainties, undermining the
usefulness of data generated in the EITI process. 185 A critical drawback of
the EITI is its looseness in attracting the participation of those states where
revenue transparency might be most effective and where ruling elites are
n
1 7EITI Guidefor Legislators, supra note 145, at 16.
17
s Id.; Duruigbo, The World Bank, supra note 53, at 48.
179 EITI, Factsheet, 1, 1 (2014), http://eiti.org/document/factsheet (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
180 Duruigbo, The World Bank, supra note 53, at 49.
Id. at 53.
182 Id. at 48-49; Firger, supra note 42, at 1063-67.
.s. Duruigbo, The World Bank, supra note 53, at 50.
14 Firger, supra note 42, at 1067.
1
s
5 Id.
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reluctant to allow transparency. Thus, due to lack of real sanctions and
shortcomings, even those countries that do participate in the EITI
validation process may not achieve the desired results. 186
Nigeria was the first country to pass the EITI standards into a domestic
law and implement the EITI. Yet, several years later, it remains plagued by
high levels of corruption."' Similarly, although Equatorial Guinea obtained
EITI Candidate status in February 2008 and was required to publish its
progress and validation report by March 2010, it made little progress toward
implementing and validating the EITI criteria. As a result, in late April 2010
Equatorial Guinea was removed from the list of Candidate Countries.'
3. Possible Advantages of the EITI to Afghanistan
Afghanistan endorsed the EITI with the hope of curbing corruption in
the private sector in addition to solving the resource curse.189 By requiring
country-by-country reporting, the EITI principles would make it harder for
multinational companies to avoid paying tax in Afghanistan. This would
result in improved tax collection because transferring profits into a low-tax
secrecy jurisdiction would no longer be an option for companies-the profits
and their taxes would stay in Afghanistan.'90 In addition, the disclosure of
companies' profits on a country-by-country basis would allow civil society
organizations to monitor and evaluate the accuracy of the reports and
monitor any discrepancies for signs of corruption.' 9' In other words, civil
society will play a major role in implementing the EITI process and
increasing transparency.
The EITI would also help Afghanistan in strengthening accountability
and good governance, as well as promoting greater economic and political
stability, which the Afghan government desperately needs.' 92 EITI further
187 Nigeria Case Study, supra note 77, at 1.
188 UnprecedentedActivity in EITICountries, EITI NEWSLETrER, (Extractive Indus. Transparency
Initiative, Oslo, Norway) (July 2010), available at http://eiti.org/files/EITI-Newsletter-2010-July.pdf.
1" Clough, supra note 130.
191 Desai &Jarvis, supra note 127, at, at 110-11.
192 Benfts from Implementing EITH, EXTRACTWE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/eiti/benefits (last visited May 29, 2013); AEITI First Report, supra note 26.
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benefits companies by alleviating political and reputational risks for them to
be involved in Afghanistan. Uncertain governance causes political instability,
which is a threat to investments. To generate returns, reducing political
instability is crucial for extractive business in Afghanistan because
investments are capital intensive and dependent on long-term stability.'93
Additionally, the EITI would help Afghanistan improve the investment
climate by providing a clear signal to investors and international financial
institutions that the Afghan government is committed to greater
transparency. A recent study by Maya Schmaljohann has indicated that by
incorporating the EITI into domestic policy and following the EITI
principles, there is an increase in foreign direct investment in a country.1 94
According to Schmaljohann, foreign investors look for institutional factors
such as credibility of the government, level of corruption, bureaucratic
efficiency, and democratic accountability.195 Likewise, the EITI aims to
increase transparency, foster sustainable institutions, and improve the
investment climate. By implementing the EITI, countries show their
commitment and willingness to reform their government, improve
transparency, and fight corruption. As such, these countries' investment
climates improve.196 On the flip side, failing to abide by those commitments
scares away foreign investors and reduces foreign investment.197
Schmaljohann's hypothesis applies in Afghanistan's context. Currently,
investors are holding off on signing extractive contracts with the government
because the contracts will be based on the existing laws, which are not
investor friendly.198 The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA)
claimed that investors are waiting for Parliament to pass the new mineral and
petroleum law. 199 On that account, the EITI would do more than just
193 id.
'
94Maya Schmaljohann, Enhancing Foreign Direct Investment via Transparency? Evaluating the
Effects ofEITI on FDI (Heidelberg Univ. Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper Series No. 538, 2012), at 5,
available at https.//eiti.org/file/Schmaljohann2013_dp538.pdf
195 Id, at 6-7.
196 id.
197 id.
198 Hazim Arash, Mines Law Gets Positive Nod, TOLO NEWS (Feb. 24, 2013),
http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/9559-mines-law-gets-positive-nod; Paige McClanahan, Could
Mining Bonanza be Afghanistan's Next Source ofFunding?, THE CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR (April 18,
2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2013/0418/Could-mining-bonanza-be-
Afghanistan-s-next-source-of-funding.
199 Shahla Murtazaie, New Mining Law Will Woo Foreign Investors intoAfghansitan, TOLO NEWS
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promote good governance-it would also attract foreign investment and
business opportunities to Afghanistan.
Finally, the Afghan people will benefit from the EITI because there will
be a great amount of information available in the public domain about the
revenue the government manages on behalf.of its citizens, thereby making
the government more accountable. 20 Thus, transparent management and
reporting of Afghanistan's natural resources would be a win-win situation for
all the parties involved. In addition, the Afghan government will have more
revenue to spend on development, infrastructure, and payment of
government employees. This increases legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.
In turn, the companies benefit from a stable and lawful environment. 201
However, all these advantages depend on whether the Afghan government
can live up to its promises to cooperate with the extractive companies and
civil society.
B. Where Afghanistan Stands Today in its Commitment to the EITI
1. Afghanistan's Candidacy in the EITI
After endorsing the EITI principles, the Afghan government sought
EITI candidacy in late 2009. After completion of all the requirements to
become an EITI candidate country, the International EITI Board officially
endorsed Afghanistan's candidacy in February 2010.202 As such, Afghanistan
was bound to abide by the EITI requirements for revenue reporting and
transparency. The EITI principles and requirements provided a great
opportunity to the Afghan government to reform both technical and political
institutions. The reforms were to include reporting revenues according to
standardized reporting requirements and signaling to investors and
international financial institutions Afghanistan's commitment to
transparency. The EITI expected these required institutional reforms to be
(May 20, 2013), http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/10557-new-mining-law-will-woo-foreign-
investors-into-afghanistan.
200 Clough, supra note 130.20 1 d
202 AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 4.
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completed within two years.203
Afghanistan started demonstrating its commitment by establishing the
EITI governance and requiring all mining companies to make their data
public. So that it could be under his dose watch, the finance minister placed
the Afghanistan EITI Secretariat Office inside the Ministry of Finance
building. Additionally, the minster appointed the national coordinator and
the EITI champion. 204 The Afghanistan EITI has also established an MSG
consisting of the Afghan government, civil society, and extractive companies,
which were empowered with voting rights, and donors and international
institutions can observe the MSG's proceedings. The MSG met once every
two months to discuss the EITI implementation.20 s
To further intensify the EITI implementation, Afghanistan committed
to publish all payments of taxes, royalties, and fees it received from its
extractive sector. 206 At the same time, a number of extractive companies
operating in Afghanistan published what they had paid to the government.207
Currently, there are 311 contracts available, some in Dari and some in
English, on the Ministry of Mining's website.208 With the expected increase
of revenues, it is a significant move towards greater transparency that the
government has committed to publish all mining, oil, and gas contracts.
President Karzai ordered the disclosure of the mining contracts in a
decree shortly after the July 2012 Tokyo conference, which highlighted the
urgent need for commitment to accountability and reduced
corruption .20 Joining only half a dozen other countries around the world, the
203 RAYMOND GILPIN & ASHLEY PANDYA, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, IMPROVING HIGH-VALUE
RESOURCE CONTRACTING IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (2010), available at
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/pb45.pdf.
20 HART RESOURCES, LTD., FINAL REPORT ON VALIDATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXTRACTVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE IN AFGHANISTAN 21, 26 (2013),
available at http://aeiti.af/site files/13943486541.pdf.205 AEITI MULTI STAKEHOLDER GROUP TERMS OF REFERENCE, AFG. EXTRACTIVE INDUS.
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 4, (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www-
wds.worldbankorg/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/09/25/000425962_2012092
5164345/Rendered/PDF/728330WP00PUBLOoved0MSGO210DecO2011.pdfI.
206 See Contracts, AFG. MINISTRY OF MINES AND PETROLEUM, http://mom.gov.af
/en/page/1384 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
207 d
208 Id.
20 Graham Bowley & Matthew Rosenberg, Mining Contract Details Disclosed in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/world/asia/mining-contract-details-
disclosed-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all.
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contracts disclosure puts Afghanistan at the forefront of the growing trend
of transparency of contracts.210
In addition, the Ministry of Mining took another step toward greater
transparency and accountability in its framing of the new extractive contracts.
Extractive contracts are now specifically required to include the issues of
transparency in their provisions. 211 For instance, Afghanistan's 2012
production sharing agreement with China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) contains a transparency clause instead of a confidentiality clause.212
The contracts that have been published include the Amu Darya oil
contract, the Qara Zaghan gold contract, and the West Garmak coal
contract. 21' The Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) still holds
unpublished the contract for the Aynak copper mine.214 In the near future,
another large contract is expected to be signed in relation to the major
Hajigak iron ore project.215 There is also talk of disclosing social payments to
comply with EITI reporting requirements. 216 With MSG oversight, these
figures would then be reconciled and published in the Afghanistan EITI
Reconciliation Report. 217 The reconciliation report identifies discrepancies
that exist between the government tax receipts and company payments. After
receiving the report, the government is expected to take measures to
eliminate those discrepancies. 218
210 ROYA Aziz & JAVED NOORANI, SHADOW VALIDATION: ANALYSIS OF AFGHANISTAN
EITI RECONCILIATION REPORTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION 9 (2012), available at
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/March_2013/Afghanistan%20EITI%20Shadow%20Validation%20R
eport.pdf.
211 See Mg. Ministry of Mines, Amu Darya Basin Tender of 2011 Exploration and Production
Sharing Contract for Hydrocarbons Exploration, Development and Production 60 (Dec. 26, 2011),
available at
http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Hydrocarbone%20Contracts/Amu%20Darya%20English%20.pdf.
212 id.
253 The released contracts are available on the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Mines
and Petroleum website, available at http://mom.gov.af/en/page/1384.
214 Global Witness, Opening up Afghanistan's extractives sector - Afghan Government Unveils First
Tranche of Mining and Oil Contracts, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/opening-
afghanistans-extractives-sector-afghan-govemment-unveils-first-tranche-mining-and (last visited Nov.
4, 2014).
21s Afghanistan Overview, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org
/Afghanistan (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
216 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 22.
2 AEITI FIRST REPORT, supra note 26, at 5.
21 Id. at 19-21.
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2. Afghanistan's EITI Reconciliation Reports
Afghanistan has published two reconciliation reports-the first in July
2012, covering two years of data (March 21, 2008 to March 20, 2010), and
the second in October 2012, covering one year of data (March 21, 2010 to
March 20, 201 1).21' The reports met Requirement 10 of the EITI, which
mandates that the government and the MSG publish these reports. 220 The
reports were published with contributions from government agencies,
including the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry of Finance, and extractive
companies (though, interestingly, one of the six companies, Wens Logistics,
did not comply with the EITI and did not respond to the reconciler's
inquiries).221
According to the first report, the government received 4.51 billion
Afghanis (approximately $82.4 million) from March 2008 to March 2009,
and 356 million Afghanis (approximately $6.4 million) from March 2009 to
March 2010.222 This is in contrast to the companies reporting to have paid
4.53 billion Afghanis (approximately $82.7 million) in March 2008 to March
2009 and 638 million Afghanis (approximately $11.6 million) in the
following year. 223 The total unresolved difference between the stated
amounts was approximately six million Afghanis (approximately $124,000)
in March 2008 to March 2009 and approximately 281 million Afghanis
(approximately $5.12 million) in the following year. 224 According to the
second report, from March 2010 to March 2011, the government received
approximately one billion Afghanis (approximately $19.4 million), but the
companies reported to have paid approximately 1.1 billion Afghanis
(approximately $20.8 million). 225 With an unresolved difference of
approximately 68 million Afghanis (approximately $1.24 million), the
219 AEITI FIRST REPORT, supra note 26; MOORE STEPHENS, AFG. EXTRACTIVE INDUS.
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE [AEITI]: AFGHANISTAN SECOND EITI RECONCILIATION REPORT
YEAR 1389, at 10 (2012) [hereinafter AEITI Second Report], available at
http://mof.gov.af/Content/files/AEITI%20-%202nd%20Reconciliation%20Report%203_10_2012%20-
%20English.pdf.
220 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
221 AEITI FIRST REPORT, supra note 26; see also AEITI Second Report, supra note 219.
222 AEITI FIRST REPORT, supra note 26, at 10, 14.
223 Id. at 10.
224 Id. at 10, 14.
225 AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 10.
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government reports indicate that they have received less revenue than
reported by the companies. 22 6
The following examples illustrate some of the discrepancies pointed out
by the reconciliation report: 1) the Ministry of Finance's Customs Division
reported 25 revenue streams,227 a number that does not match the companies'
reporting; 2) the companies' claimed they paid four revenue streams of
approximately one million Afghanis (818,000) to the government, which was
not confirmed by the government; 228 and 3) the Afghan Investment
Company (AIC), connected to President Hamid Karzai's brother Mahmoud,
has decreased payments from between twelve and sixteen million Afghanis
($218,000 to 290,000) down to about 1.6 million Afghanis (S29,000).229 The
report indicates that the representatives of AIC did not attend any of the
Afghanistan EITI meetings arranged to resolve the differences in
reporting.230
In the discrepancies that exist in the revenue management of the mining
contracts, the reports highlight one of the most important issues surrounding
the governance regime in Afghanistan's mining sector-corruption. Both the
volume of income and the degree of discrepancies varied greatly from one
year to the next. For example, there was an approximately $1.24 million
shortfall in the amount the government received from companies in 2010 and
an approximately $5.12 million shortfall in 2009.231 Not to mention, the
reconciler adopted a cumulative accounting method of the discrepancies,
which actually underestimated the degree of discrepancy. The purpose of the
reconciliation reports was to evaluate the degree to which the accounts of the
government and the companies matched, but the reports showed
discrepancies from both the government and companies reporting
inaccurately high figures.232
226 id.
227 ROYA AzIz &JAVED NOORANI, EISOuRcEBooK, SHADOW VALIDATION: ANALYSIS OF
AFGHANISTAN EITI RECONCILIATION REPORTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION (2012),
available at
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/March-2013/Afghanistan%20EITI%20Shadow%2Validation%20R
eport.pdf.
228 id
229 Id. at 13.
230 AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 27, 33.
3 Id. at 14; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 10.
2 AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 8-9; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 8-9.
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In response to these discrepancies, the Mining Ministry claimed that it
had conducted an internal investigation of its revenue streams, especially
looking into payments made by MCC, where the largest discrepancy was
identified."' The MCC's contract, one of the country's biggest and most
lucrative mining contracts, was not published, and accusations of bribery have
surrounded the contract for years.234 The contract was signed by the previous
minister with a non-disclosure (rather than transparency) clause, which
makes it very controversial considering the current endemic corruption in
Afghanistan. 235 As it turns out, a committee, including the Deputy Minister
of Mines and the governor of the Logar province (the province where the
Aynak Copper extraction is located), distributed the discrepant money to 101
Logar families. All payments were fully documented to satisfy the
transparency requirements.236
Accordingly, given these gross discrepancies, the reconciliation reports
demonstrate Afghanistan's failure to comply with several of the EITI
requirements. Bearing in mind these failures, the discrepancies can also
frustrate Afghanistan's achievement of EITI compliant status.
3. Afghanistan in Pursuit of Compliant Status: Afghanistan's Validation
Process
Afghanistan will be granted the EITI Compliant status only when the
EITI International Board confirms that the country meets all the EITI
requirements through a validation process. Afghanistan's validation was set
for completion in August 2012,237 but the Afghanistan EITI could not find
anyone to validate Afghanistan's EITI compliance. None of the accredited
validators the EITI International Secretariat introduced showed interest in
233 Statement on EITINational Reconciliation Reportfor Mining Revenues in 1389, AFG. MINISTRY
OF MINES AND PETROLEUM, http://mom.gov.af/en/page/8151 [hereinafter Statement on EITINational
Reconciliation Report] (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
234 Graham Bowley & Matthew Rosenberg, Mining Contract Details Disclosed in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.comf/2012/10/16/world/asia/mining-contract-details-
disdosed-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all.
2351d.
236 Statement on EIH National Reconciliation Report, supra note 233.237 AEITI Multi Stakeholder Group, Minutes ofMulti Stakeholder Group Meeting with Validator
on Validation of the Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (Dec. 1, 2011), available
at http://www.aeiti.af/sitefiles/13942530811.pdf.
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undertaking the validation. 23' Afghanistan's deadline was thereafter
extended, and Afghanistan submitted its validation report on February 9,
2013.239 The EITI International Secretariat was finally able to persuade a
company called the Hart Group to carry out Afghanistan's validation
process. 24 Founded in 1988 with extensive experience and relationships
across the world, the Hart Group has been accredited by the EITI Board as
an official "validator."24 1 Accordingly, the Hart Group carried out the
validation process and found that Afghanistan was not fully in compliance
with the EITI standards and was not eligible for the EITI membership 2 42
Afghanistan met several of the EITI requirements (nine out of 21),243 but
this was not sufficient for validation. Afghanistan met requirements one and
two, in which countries are required to issue an unequivocal statement of
intention to implement the EITI and work actively with civil society and
extractive companies. 24 The Afghan Finance Minister and Mining
Minister have widely demonstrated through public statements the
government's intention to implement the EITI. 245 They also created a
working group prior to the implementation of the EITI, which involved
both civil society and extractive companies. 2 ' Also, no legislative obstacles
existed in civil society and company participations. 247
The Afghan government further acted in compliance with
Requirement Three, which required appointing a senior individual to lead
the implementation of the EITI.248 The Finance minister, Mr. Zakhilwal, a
senior administrator in the Afghan government, was chosen to both lead
and serve as champion of the EITI implementation. 249 In addition,
Afghanistan met Requirement Seven by actively engaging with the
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 See HART RESOURCES LTD., FINAL REPORT ON VALIDATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
OFTHE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENcY INITIATIVE IN AFGHANISTAN (2013) [hereinafter
Validation Report], available at http://aeiti.af/site-fles/13943486541.pdf.
243 Id. at 86-87.
244 Id. at 23.
245 Id. at 21.246Id at23.
247 Id. at 24.
24Afghanistan Close ojoiningEITI, EITI (Apr. 1, 2010), https://eiti.org/news-events/afghanistan-
has-decided-join-eiti.
249 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 25.
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extraction companies to fully implement the EITI. 250 According to the
validation report, "six companies were identified as meeting the threshold
criteria for overall contribution to Government and these have specified,
with contact information, in the TOR [terms of responsibilities] for the
Validators." 251 These companies have been active and engaging throughout
Afghanistan's candidacy.252
The Afghanistan EITI further acted in accordance with EITI
Requirement Nine, which requires an agreement by the MSG on the
definition of the threshold materiality. 253 The Afghanistan EITI MSG
included all mining companies with annual payment equal to or exceeding
7.5 million Afghanis ($136,000) to the Government. 254 Afghanistan also
met Requirement Ten by appointing Azerbaijan of the international
company Moore Stephen to publish a credible, trustworthy, and technically
competent reconciliation. 255 Afghanistan met Requirement Sixteen by
publishing the reconciliation reports that were satisfactory to the MSG.256
The reports were endorsed and confirmed as satisfactory by the Afghanistan
EITI as well.2 57 Afghanistan met Requirement Eighteen when it made
available to the public the first and the second reconciliation reports.25 The
reports are publicly available on the Afghanistan EITI website.259 Finally,
Afghanistan met Requirement Nineteen when all the oil, gas, and mining
companies cooperated with validation and reported and supported the EITI
implementation.260
The Afghanistan EITI MSG, including the Afghan government,
extracting companies, and civil society, claimed to have met requirement
250 i
251 Id. at 46.
252 id.
253 T254 AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 5; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 5; Wadia
Samadi, Minutes of Meeting with the AEITI Working Group on Materiality Threshold, 1, 3 (July 11,
2011), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB
/2012/09/26/000425962_20120926153758/Rendered/PDF/72914WPOOPUBLOheOMSGOonOthresh
old.pdf; Validation Report, supra note 242, at 50.
255 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13; Validation Report, supra note 242, at 54.
2s6 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 69.
257 Id. at 70.
2ss AEITI First Report, supra note 26; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219.2
s9 Id. at 78.
260 Id. at 80.
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numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 and 20.261 These requirements are
essential to achieving compliant status. However, the fulfillment of these
requirements is controversial because the validation report asserts that the
Afghanistan EITI has not yet been able to complete those requirements,
thus making it difficult for Afghanistan to achieve compliant status.262
Afghanistan is not in compliance with Requirement Four because it
could not establish a competent MSG.263 The Afghanistan EITI, however,
claims that it had established an MSG and acted in accordance with
Requirement Four. 264 The validation report did not agree with the
government's claim, and further noted that there is no institutional or
structural mechanism for a competent MSG.265 The report also indicated
that though civil society agreed that the MSG's establishment was
satisfactory and that they effectively engaged with other stakeholders,
companies and governmental agencies were reluctant to work in
collaboration with other stakeholders. 266 As such, though the MSG was
functional, the lack of effective administrative mechanisms denied civil
society and companies successful representation. 267
Afghanistan fell short of meeting Requirement Five because it could not
employ a meaningful work plan. Requirement Five calls for publishing of a
work plan that can be used as a vehicle for planning strategy for long-term
sustainability of the EITI implementation. 2 68 The Afghanistan EITI has
published an updated work plan with measurable targets and costs indicated
on the Afghanistan EITI's website. 2 69 Although Afghanistan has made
progress in this respect by publishing a work plan that entails a measurable
target, it does not currently employ the work plan as a vehicle for planning
long-term sustainability and future implementation of the EITI process,
26' Itemad Khan, Afg. Ministry of Fin., Minutes of AEITI Multi Stakeholder Meeting (Jan. 23,
2013) [hereinafter Khan], available at http://www.aeiti.af/site-files/13940234041.pdf.
262 Id.
263 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
26 Khan, supra note 261, at 1.
265 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 30-31.
2
6 Id. at 32.
267 Id. at 34.
268 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
269 See AEITI Multi-Stakeholder Group, AEITI Country Work Plan (Feb. 9, 2013), available at
https://eiti.org/files/Work%20PIan%20Updated%202nd%20June%202013.pdf
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which is an essential component of Requirement Five.270
Afghanistan could not meet Requirement Six because it lacked an
effective engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the EITI
process. 271 Requirement Six states that the government is required to ensure
that civil society is fily involved and engaged in the EITI process.272 The
presence of CSOs in implementing the EITI process is an absolute necessity
for Afghanistan to achieve compliant status. The Afghanistan EITI claims
that it has always supported developing a civil society to engage in effective
implementation of the EITI. 273 Civil society was particularly active in
defining materiality, making a reporting template, and building the annual
work plan. 274 Yet, the validators believe that the MSG and the Afghan
government have not formalized the bases of the CSOs' participation in the
EITI process.275 In other words, no formal interactions with civil society
coalitions exist in Afghanistan's EITI.
Afghanistan has not met Requirement Eight because there remain
obstacles in the full implementation of the EITI process. Requirement Eight
instructs the government to remove any obstacles to the implementation of
the EITI.27 6 According to the MSG report, Presidential Decree Forty-Five
was created to require disclosure of all contracts in full, which makes
Afghanistan one of the few countries that has disclosed all contracts awarded.
This means that Afghanistan has taken critical steps in removing barriers to
the EITI implementation.m However, the validators believe that it is not
the disclosure of contracts but the legal and regulatory frameworks that are
currently obstacles of successful EITI implementation. 278 Afghanistan's
Mineral Law of 2009 and Income Tax Law of 2009 allow for confidentiality
clauses, which make it difficult for the Afghanistan's EITI to further disclose
all awarded contracts.
Afghanistan is not in compliance with Requirement Eleven because
270 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 37.
271 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
272 id.
" Khan, supra note 261, at 1.
274 id
275 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 44.
276 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
277 Khan, supra note 261.
278 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 47.
279 Id. at 49
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some of the extractive companies did not report their payments to the
government. Requirement Eleven mandates that the Afghan government
ensure that all relevant companies and governmental entities report.2 80 In a
MSG meeting, the Afghan EITI claimed that considerable progress has been
made to meet this requirement.28' Except MCC, the other companies all
reported their payments to the Afghan government in their reconciliation
reports. 282 Yet having reviewed the discrepancies in the reconciliation
reports, the validator's evaluation articulates the fact that most of the
discrepancies had to do with MCC's failure to comply by the EITI reporting
requirements.283
Afghanistan fell short of meeting Requirement Twelve because it did
not employ international standards to control and audit companies' reports.
Requirement Twelve urges the government to ensure that company reports
are based on accounts audited with international standards.284 The Afghan
government claims that a Memorandum of Understanding between the
Ministry of Mines, Ministry of Finance, and extractive companies was signed
to hire a firm to resolve the discrepancies of the two reports.28 s The firm was
tasked with resolving these discrepancies using international standards.286
Afghanistan's Mineral Law of 2009 further required the companies to
prepare their balance sheet in accordance with income tax law and the
International Accounting Standard. A new proposed amendment to the
mineral law deals with this issue even more firmly by incorporating this
requirement into its provisions. 288 However, the validation report does not
agree with the Afghan government and believes that the auditing of corporate
accounts is "poorly established" in Afghanistan. 289
Afghanistan is not yet in compliance with Requirement Thirteen
because Afghanistan did not use the International Auditing System while
collecting the reports. Requirement Thirteen, similar to Requirement
" EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
281 Khan, supra note 261, at 1.
2' AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 6; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 6.
283 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 57.
2 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
285 Khan, supra note 261, at 1.286 id.
287 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 59.
2 8
' Id. at 61.
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Twelve, asks the government to ensure that the government reports are based
on accounts audited with international standards, but adds that the
government must have the MSG's content regarding administration of the
International Auditing System. 290 The Afghan government has done a
number of things to meet this requirement. Through governmental agencies,
Afghanistan has ensured that the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, and other international financial institutions recognized the
accounting system.291 Furthermore, the government fully implemented the
Standard Integrated Governmental Tax Administration System and
Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to meet the
requirement. 292 However, the validators believe that Afghanistan lacks
capacity and heavily relies on foreign consultant support and advisors for
control and audit.293 Moreover, additional amendments, including a better
mechanism for auditing and control, have not yet been passed by
Afghanistan's Parliament.294
Afghanistan has not met Requirement Fourteen because it could not
make an agreed reporting template that ensures a proper accounting
system. 295 Requirement Fourteen requires companies to comprehensively
disclose all material payments in accordance with the agreed reporting
templates. 296 The Afghanistan EITI believes that MSG agreed and
published a template in the Afghanistan EITI's website. 297 Extracting
companies used that template to disclose their material payment. The
companies were registered with the Ministry of Finance, and were, therefore,
subject to the laws of Afghanistan and the EITI requirements. 298 The
validation report, however, disagrees with this argument. According to
validation report, the reconciler recommended a move from paper-based
accounting to a more sophisticated accounting system that ensures proper
accounting to the Afghan government. 299 Considering the large
2 EITIRules, supra note 141, at 25.
291 See Khan, supra note 261.
292 Id.
293 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 63.
294 id.
295 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 47.
296 at 13.
297 See Khan, supra note 261.
298 id
299 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 66.
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discrepancies and lack of effort by the government to resolve them, it is too
soon to tell if all companies have comprehensively disclosed their
payments.300
Afghanistan has not met Requirement Fifteen because companies either
over-reported and/or under-reported their material revenues. 301
Requirement Fifteen mandates that government agencies comprehensively
disclose all material revenues in accordance with the agreed reporting
templates.302 The Afghanistan EITI and MSG believe that they have met
this requirement by unanimously agreeing on the reporting template.303 They
emphasized that there were discrepancies in these reports, but that that does
not mean the disclosures were not in compliance with the reporting
templates. 3 The validators, however, believe that Afghanistan falls short of
meeting this requirement because many of the companies reported paying
more than the governments received. 305 This is a clear illustration of over-
reporting by the companies and under-reporting by government, which casts
blame on the government for not reporting large payments.306
Afghanistan is not in compliance with Requirement Seventeen because
it could not explain most of the discrepancies in the reconciliation reports.
Requirement Seventeen obliges the reconciler to ensure comprehensiveness
of the EITI reports, identify all discrepancies, explain those discrepancies,
and make necessary recommendations for further efforts. 307 The Afghanistan
EITI has hired Moore Stephen to publish reconciliation reports. Reconciler
Moore Stephen has published two reconciliation reports-the first in July
2012, covering two years of data (March 21, 2008 to March 20, 2010), and
the second in October 2012, covering one year of data (March 21, 2010 to
March 20, 2011).30s The unresolved discrepancies were identified in the
reports and further recommendations were given to remedy discrepancies in
future reporting." However, the validation report states that the report was
300 id.
301 See EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 21.
32 Id. at 13.
' Khan, supra note 261, at 1.304 Id.
s Validation Report, supra note 242, at 68.
30 id.
30" EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
30 AEITI First Report, supra note 26; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219.
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not comprehensive because the reconciler could not explain most of the
discrepancies in the reports. 310 The validators further found that the
reconciler's recommendations were broad, rather than addressing specific
problems and providing solutions.3 1 ' At the same time, the Afghanistan
EITI has not taken any steps to remedy discrepancies and did not follow any
of the reconciler's recommendations.312
Finally, Afghanistan has not met Requirement Twenty because it
currently cannot ensure a sustainable EITI implementation. Requirement
Twenty urges the government and MSG to take steps to act on lessons
learned, address discrepancies, and ensure sustainable EITI
implementation;31 ' however, the validation report states that Afghanistan
could not use its work plan effectively as a vehicle for planning future
activities, such as ensuring sustainability of the EITI by taking essential steps
and finding funding. 314
Unfortunately, after reviewing the validation process and validation
report, and analyzing what Afghanistan had done so far in its commitment
to the EITI implementation, Afghanistan did not meet some of the essential
requirements and was not granted compliant status. 315 Nevertheless,
Afghanistan's candidacy was extended for another eighteen months to meet
the essential requirements discussed above.3" Normally, countries are not
given deadline extension more than eighteen months, (i.e., Equatorial
Guinea.)31 7
Due to the progress that Afghanistan made throughout its candidacy,
the EITI Secretariat believed that Afghanistan deserved another eighteen
months to fulfill all the EITI requirements.1 Afghanistan's next deadline
for validation is October 10, 2014.319 Eighteen months is a long time and it
seems that Afghanistan had a long way to go before it would achieve
310 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 76.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 77.
313 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
314 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 83-85.
315 See generally, Validation Report, supra note 242.
316 EITI, EITI Board Decision on Afghanistan, (Apr. 10, 2013), available at
https://eiti.org/files/Afghanistan.pdf
317 EITI Newsletter, supra note 188.
31. EITI Board Decision, supra note 316.
319 id
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compliant status.
IV. PRIORITIES FOR ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN
The government of Afghanistan should make it a priority to implement
the EITI criteria and principles to achieve compliant status.320 In the RWI's
2013 RGI, Afghanistan is named among nine of the fifteen worst performers
having scored a sixty-three out of one hundred for freedom of information
law and only three out of one hundred in state-owned companies' production
data, revenue data, quasi-fiscal activities, and use of international accounting
standards. 321 This ranking has once again illustrated the fact that
Afghanistan has weak reporting qualities, a limited or weak institutional
capacity, ineffective laws, and lacks experience.
This ranking also indicates that Afghanistan needs to commit beyond
mere reporting to follow in Botswana's footsteps. In Afghanistan, good
institutions are vital for averting the negative impacts of natural resource
extraction. Afghan policy makers should, therefore, prioritize the
development of institutions governing the private sector. 322 This can be
achieved through institutionalizing the EITI into legal and governance
structures and strengthening the capacity of civil society to provide a strong
audit and monitoring mechanism for evaluation.
This, however, is easier said than done-key EITI requirements include
the establishment of an effective MSG, removal of all obstacles towards the
EITI implementation, and the disclosure of comprehensive reports of
companies' payments and governments' revenues. Afghanistan has not yet
met any of those requirements. Even if Afghanistan did obtain compliance
status, it does not necessarily mean that all those requirements have been
fulfiled or that is has successfully avoided the resource curse. Rather, it is a
strong first step on the road to full revenue transparency and
accountability.323
32o Clough, supra note 130.
321 RGI, supra note 39, at 9, 16.
s Kolstad, supra note 43, at 4.
3 Weidner, supra note 25, at 238-40; GILPIN &PANDYA, supra note 203, at 4.
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A. What Needs to be Done?
Transparency can be drowned out in environments that lack post-
conflict enhanced natural resources management. In conflict-affected and
resource-dependent countries like Afghanistan, extractive sector governance
represents a crucial arena in which the state political factions, private sector,
and society will need to agree on how the sector should be governed and how
its revenues should be used.324 In other words, a collaborative partnership
between extractive firms, governments, and civil society, may prove effective
in addressing endemic corruption and its negative spillovers. The EITI is an
example of such collaboration. 325 Therefore, to strengthen Afghanistan's
institutional capacity, it is essential to institutionalize the EITI principles
into the legal and governance structure of Afghanistan. This
institutionalization will require some of the laws to be amended to remove
ambiguities and obstacles in implementing the EITI principles.
Institutionalization can establish clear objectives for the government,
extractive companies, and civil society. Additionally, a neutral and strong civil
society backed by the government will provide crucial support in attaining
that goal.
1. Institutionalizing the EITI Principles into the Existing Laws
There is a strong demand for governments to endorse and
institutionalize the EITI into statutory law. The institutionalization ensures
government's commitment to continuity and long-term sustainability. It
shows the government's political will and support for the EITI if the EITI
principles are embedded in statutory law, rather than simply carried out by a
presidential decree, as is currently the case in Afghanistan.326 For instance, in
2007, the Nigerian National Assembly passed into law the Nigeria Extractive
324 Gillies &Dykstra, supra note 25, at 255.
32s Susan Ariel Aaronson, Limited Partnership: Business, Government, Civil Society, and the Public in
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, PUBLIC ADMIN. DEV. 31, 51-52 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1726173.
326 PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY & REVENUE WATCH INST., EYE ON EM: CIVIL SOCIETY
PERSPECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE 22 (October 2006) [hereinafter PWVYP & RWI], available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.
org/programs/ailrti/international/laws-papers/intl/eye-oneiti-report.pdf.
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Industries Transparency Initiative Act (NEITI ACT), making the EITI
principles mandatory facets of its domestic laws. The NEITI Act requires
the Nigerian EITI to promote transparency in extractive revenues as well as
ensure transparency and accountability in the expenditure of revenues
received from the extractive industries.32 7 It further established the Nigerian
MSG and laid down principles for carrying out EITI governance. 328 This act
not only ensured implementation of the EITI principles, it also promoted
sustainability of the EITI by creating a formal government agency under the
President of Nigeria. 329 Finally, it increased sanctions for violators of the
act. 330 Though the NEITI ACT might not be able to completely eradicate
corruption in the extractive industry, it can be a major first step towards
greater transparency and accountability for the Nigerian government.3 3 1
In Afghanistan, the EITI principles are currently not incorporated into
domestic laws, making the EITI reporting requirements non-mandatory by
law. This has created legal and regulatory obstacles towards the EITI
implementation. Thus, removing legal and regulatory obstacles to
implementation remains the biggest priority for Afghanistan. 332
Since Afghanistan already has enough laws regulating extractive
industries, it would be more practical and effective to incorporate the EITI
principles into existing laws, rather than to create an entirely new act like the
Nigerian EITI Act.33 One thing common in all laws dealing with natural
resource extraction in Afghanistan is the principle of confidentiality. The
Mineral Law of 2009, the Hydrocarbon Law of 2009, the Income Tax Law
of 2009, and the Customs Code of 2005 all have confidentiality clauses in
them, making it hard for the government to disclose payments and taxes.
However, none make any specific reference to transparency issues or the
EITI process.
Currently, the Mineral Law of 2009 requires separate application for
327 See Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act (NEITI) (2007), available at
http://www.neiti.org.ng/sites/default/files/documents/uploads/neitiact.pdf
328 1d
329 Id.
330 d
331 Nigeria Case Study, supra note 77, at 1-2, 4; see generally, NEITI, supra note 327.
332 Afghanistan EITI Implementation, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INInATvE,
https://eiti.org/Afghanistan/implementation (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (discussing two types of proposed
litigation that would promote transparency).
" Collier, supra note 59, at 25.
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exploration and exploitation licenses. 334 These licenses are issued strictly
through a bidding process. However, the law has no dear provision to address
whether and when a company that has invested in exploration obtains
preferential consideration in the bidding for exploitation of the same area.
Thus, exploration is a high-risk strategy for the investors because it may not
generate a return. The law makes no reference to the EITI process or
transparency issues. It does not have any provisions regarding taxes, custom
duties, and other charges. Finally, the law implies mandatory bidding even
for extraction of small amounts of quarry minerals.33s
The Mineral Law of 2009 should be amended to simplify the tender
and licensing procedures. The law should reiterate transparency issues and
make specific reference to the EITI process and its principles. In addition,
the law should make reporting of the companies' payments and government's
receipt mandatory. It should further adhere to an audit system that is based
on the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) issued by the International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) of the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in reporting the revenues paid by the
companies and received by the government. 3 3 6 The law should also contain
provisions regarding the taxes, custom duties, and other charges. Finally, the
law should eliminate bidding quarrels to encourage investment.
The Afghan laws deal poorly with the requirement to audit corporate
accounts. There is limited demand for audit services, other than in insurance
and banking law. As a result, Afghanistan lacks a corporate regulator, though
Da Afghanistan Bank, the only banking regulator in Afghanistan, does
maintain a relatively proactive supervision process.33 1 Moreover, the Control
and Audit Law of 1981 is weak and does not provide Afghanistan's Control
and Audit Office (CAO) with sufficient capacity and independence to serve
effectively as Afghanistan's Supreme Audit Institution. The CAO has
budgetary dependence, and the lack of independence interferes with the
334 Minerals Law, supra note 110, at arts. 25, 28, 30.
33s Validation Report, supra note 242, at 10.
336 AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 15, 16; AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 19-21;
WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTING THE EXTRAcTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INInATIvE:
APPLYING EARLY LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 63 (2008) [hereinafter World Bank], available at
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6399.
3 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 61.
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CAO's planning, reviewing, and reporting processes. Hence, the CAO
cannot effectively detect and prevent corruption."' The Control and Audit
Law of 1981 needs significant amendment to simplify the CAO's roles and
responsibilities. The Control and Audit Law needs to provide a dear
operational framework for the CAO to avoid the conflict of responsibility
between Afghanistan's Finance Ministry and the CAO. The law needs to
incorporate an audit system that is based on the ISA. This would require the
government to change the principles of paper-based accounting to a more
effective accounting program that can provide a better accounting system and
a transparent recording system."3 Finally, the law must make it mandatory
for the audit entities to follow CAO's recommendations, or demand access
to necessary documents, officials, and premises to effectively publish audit
reports.
Fortunately, the Afghan government incorporated some of the changes
recommended above by integrating the EITI principles into the revised
mineral law currently being finalized and submitted to the Afghan
Parliament. 30 The new proposed mineral law was long delayed in
Afghanistan's Ministry of Justice and cabinet over concerns that the law
failed to protect national interests from foreign exploitation. The delay in
approval of the new legislation caught the United States and other foreign
donors by surprise. 34 1 Finally, the Ministry of Mines and Ministry of Justice
agreed that improvement was needed to the current Mineral Law of 2009 to
address deficiencies. The improvement would come as an amendment to the
new proposed Minerals Law of 2012 and Petroleum Law of 2012. In
February 2013, Afghanistan's cabinet approved the bill. The bill passed
Afghan Parliament and was signed into law by President Karzai in August
2014.342
..s Id. at 15.
131 See generally AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 15-16; AEITI Second Report, supra note
219, at 19-21.
3' Katarina Kuai, Afghan Civil Society Coordinates Oil, Gas and Mining Advocacy, REVENUE
WATCH INST. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/afghan-civil-society-
coordinates-oil-gas-and-mining-advocacy.
341 Mirwais Harooni, Dylan Welch & Jason Webb, Afghan Cabinet Gives Preliminary Approval to
Delayed Mining Law, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/23/
us-afghanistan-mining-idUSBRE91MOC920130223.
34 Lynne O'Donnell, Does Afghanistan's New Mining Law Benefit Its Mafias?, FOREIGN POLY'
(Sep. 3, 2014), http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/09/03/does-afghanistan s new-mining
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The new mineral law was written after extensive consultation with
extractive industry stakeholders, such as the Mining Ministry, the
Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and extractive
companies. 343 The new law brings tender, licensing, exploration, and
exploitation procedures in line with international norms and creates
regulations for employment, infrastructure, and environmental protection.
Most importantly, the law specifically adheres to the EITI principles and
strongly emphasizes transparency, predictability, and accountability in
extraction of natural resources. 3 "
2. Increasing the Role of the Afghan Government in the EITI
Implementation
Though the EITI principles reiterate upon collaboration between the
MSG members, it is ultimately the Afghan government that must play and
act as the main driving force for implementation. The Afghan government
can provide political leadership and support. This support includes providing
political leadership, the means (such as secretariats or implementation units
to support the MSG and develop work plans), and the resources to take the
EITI forward. The government can further provide legal basis through
incorporating the EITI principles in their current laws or adopting new laws,
as previously discussed. Finally, governments can increase transparency by
releasing details of their revenue.345
Unfortunately, some Board members in the EITI secretariat in the early
stages of Afghanistan's commitment to the EITI have tested Afghanistan's
political will and commitment to fully implement the EITI requirements. 346
Afghanistan's lack of commitment seemed particularly evident when the
Afghan government showed little or no interest in resolving the discrepancies
law_benefititsmafias.
343 See Consultation with Private Sector on Improved Minerals Legislation, AFG. MINISTRY OF
MINES AND PETROLEUM (May 13,2012), http://mom.gov.af/en/news/9541.
' See Ministry of Mines Begins Consultative Process in Support of Improved Mineral Laws, AFG.
MINISTRY OF MINES AND PETROLEUM (May 5,2012), http://mom.gov.af/en/news/9301.
345 WORLD BANK, supra note 336, at 47.
346 See EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI) MULTI-DONOR TRUST
FUND, PROGRESS REPORT UPDATE TO THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, (April 13,2010), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEXTINDTRAINI/Resources/progress-report
march_2010.pdf.
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identified in the two reconciliation reports. The reconciler recommended
that Afghanistan appoint an appropriate party to continue working with
extractive companies and government agencies to address and resolve all
unresolved discrepancies identified in the two reconciliation reports.
According to the validation report, the Afghan government, to date, has
made little or no progress in addressing the issue of discrepancies.3 4 7 This
shows lack of political will and commitment by the Afghan government to
implement the EITI requirements. Lack of political will and commitment
occurs when strong and transparent government institutions are lacking in a
country. With large and unregulated funds streaming to government,
politicians and those in power in the Afghan government can be tempted to
engage in corruption. 348 Thus, the Afghan government must show political
will by increasing its role in the EITI implementation. This requires
strengthening institutional capacity and pledging to honestly report the
availability of mining revenues to the public domain.
Afghanistan can start this process by disaggregating the data in the
reconciliation reports. The two reconciliation reports were published in
disaggregating form only at a company level, not delving into the types of
revenue, which created a number of problems for civil society, companies,
and governments to deal with discrepancies. 34 9 The disaggregation of the
data in the reports will provide the opportunity for the MSG to know which
companies are paying what kinds of revenues. In other words, disaggregation
means the revenues and payments should be presented in more detail. For
instance, Nigeria has published disaggregated data with the information
broken down into payments and receipts relating to particular companies and
revenue streams. This would help the civil society to clearly identify the
source of leakage and take steps to fix the problem.350 Additionally, the
Afghan government needs to publish the annual report within a maximum
of nine months of the year's end to ensure a better participation of both
extractive companies and government agencies.
Ultimately, the Afghan government must appoint a government
347 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 71-77.
348 PWYP &RWI, supra note 326, at 13.
3 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 21.
350 PWYP &RWI, supra note 326, at 21-22.
AFGHANISTAN EXPECTATIONS -2
representative to work with those representing extractive companies to
reconcile their amounts paid and received. This would ensure the stability of
the annual reports and avoid unresolved discrepancies at the early stage of
reporting. 31 Finally, the governments must organize more workshops and
trainings for reconciliation process participants. The goal will be to provide
knowledge of the EITI process and ensure that the participants are aware of
the accounting systems and principles based on international standards. 352
3. Companies Committing to Implement the EITI
Multinational extractive companies are one of the principal constituents
of the EITI. They have participated in the EITI implementation in many
countries and in many ways, including helping to jump-start an EITI process,
shape the EITI scope, report the data for reconciliation, and communicate
the EITI results. 35 3 Also, companies under the EITI principles are required
to comprehensively disclose all material payments related to their extraction
of natural resources. 354
In Afghanistan, companies often hesitate to publicly disclose their
profits because that would put their business reputation and competitiveness
in danger. This is because companies in the early stages of contracting might
have signed the contract through a corrupt deal.3 ss For instance, in 2009,
Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines was accused of accepting a thirty million
dollar bribe to award China the rights to develop its copper mines. The
contract had a confidentiality clause to avoid the disclosure of revenues.356
Thus, because the companies played a major role in bringing transparency to
the mining sector, and since they are the supply side of corruption equation,
they need to be honest in reporting and resist any attempt of bribery. This
honesty would in turn increase their reputation as honest companies, and
would bolster their commitment to the EITI implementation. This would
31 See AEITI First Report, supra note 26, at 14-16; see also AEITI Second Report, supra note 219,
at 19-21.
352 AEITI Second Report, supra note 219, at 14.
353 WORLD BANK, supra note 336, at 53.
354 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
ass KOCHAN & GOODYEAR, supra note 25, at 4; Validation Report, supra note 242, at 80.
3s6 Sengupta, supra note 20; Risen, supra note 4.
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also give the companies credibility, foster good business principles, and
bolster their industry leadership. 357
Fortunately for Afghanistan, there are no legal obstacles for the
companies to participate and interact with the other EITI stakeholders,
including the government and civil society. Yet, the Afghan government has
not yet formally interacted with the private Sector, and there is no formal
memorandum of understanding between the two stakeholders. Therefore,
extractive companies representing the private sector must formalize their
participation through a Memorandum of Understanding. This formality can
deter the new emerging challenges that will spring up as international
companies come and work alongside the medium and small-scale mining
sector companies. 358
Moreover, the inclusion of the government companies in reporting is
poorly regulated. For example, the Afghan Emerald Company trades in a
robust sector of gemstone production and collects payments on behalf of
government for a product on which no royalties have yet been paid. The
Ministry of Mining's record of payment shows very small levels of annual
payments for the periods under reconciliation reports disclosed by the
government. The Afghan Emerald Company was also not identified in the
list of seventeen companies making payment to the government agencies.35
While it may be true that the Afghan laws have confidentiality clauses
concerning disclosure of revenues, the government can still reach an
agreement via an official letter that the clause does not apply in the case of
EITI implementation.36 0 Therefore, the state-owned companies, private
companies, and all departments of the Ministry of Mining must report.
Finally, the mining companies in Afghanistan have poor financial audit
mechanisms. The current reports from extractive companies are not subject
to third-party financial audit systems that are in line with international
standards. This has created problems in auditing and reporting of the
revenues to the government, ultimately causing more unresolved
7 DAVE PREscoTr ET AL., EITI BUSINEss GUIDE: How COMPANIES CAN SUPPORT
IMPLEMENTATION 9 (2008), available at http://eiti.org/files/document/EITI%2OBusiness
%20Guide.pdf.
. Validation Report, supra note 242, at 34.
*19 Id. at 57.
a6 Prescott et al., supra note 357, at 19.
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discrepancies. Therefore, the extractive companies must be required to
endorse and bring their audit system in line with international financial
management systems and standards. 3 61
4. Increasing the Role of Civil Society in Providing a Strong Control and
Audit Mechanism
The participation of CSO is central to the EITI process. Though CSOs
cannot fill the government's shoes in implementing the EITI, they can still
play a vital role by providing a strong audit and control mechanism. CSOs
provide essential support to the EITI through their advocacy, training,
monitoring, and facilitation efforts. Thus, CSOs are not just consulted as the
initiative begins, but are actively involved in designing, steering, and
governing the process.362
Moreover, TI believes that the fight against corruption could only be
effective if it happens internally. This ensures that anti-corruption efforts are
sustainable intrinsically linked with national ownership. 3 63 In Nigeria, for
instance, one of the reasons why the EITI implementation was not as
successful in combating corruption in the extractive industry as it was
expected to be, was that CSOs were being marginalized in the EITI process.
Based on PWYP and RWI's report on CSOs' perspective, CSOs could not
even contribute in the making of a work plan in Nigeria. 3 The Nigerian
government, for the most part, did not support the CSOs in implementing
the EITI.36s The CSOs' actions did not cover sufficient numbers of people
or educate them in the depth needed for true civil society accountability to
be possible in the EITI. Also, the CSOs' representatives were not formally
endorsed in Nigeria.366 The CSO that participated in the Nigerian MSG
minute meetings did not represent the broader civil society coalition. As a
361 Integrity Watch Afg., Release of Afghan Mining Report by AE1Y a Welcome Step Yet More
Transparency is Critical, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Integrity Watch Afg.],
available at http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/resources/release-afghan-mining-report-aeiti-welcome-
step-yet-more-transparency-critical.
362 Eigen, Coalition, supra note 43, at 416-20; WORLD BANK, supra note 336, at 13; Stakeholders,
EITI, http://eiti.org/supporters/civilsociety (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
36 Eigen, Coalition, supra note 43, at 423.
3 PWYP &RWI, supra note 326, at 15.
365 See id.366Id.
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result, the CSOs in Nigeria effectively lacked the capacity to scrutinize
revenue management in Nigeria in early stages of the EITI
implementation.367
Meanwhile, much of the acclamation in resource-rich countries that
have successfully dealt with the resource curse can be credited to their
informed civil society. For example, Botswana, unlike Nigeria, has a civil
society that is aware of the kind of issues involved in extractive industries. 68
The CSOs in Botswana were strongly supported by their government.3 69
Botswana's civil society was strong, competent, and effective in helping to
audit and monitor Botswana's natural resource industry and to boost its
economy.3 70 Botswana escaped the resource curse because it had a competent
civil society that dealt with its diamond wealth since it was discovered in the
1960s.371
Unlike Botswana, which has experienced few conflicts since the
discovery of its natural resource, in post-settlement Afghanistan, CSOs are
perceived to be too weak to mount an effective anti-corruption campaign. 372
Rather, anti-corruption strategies are seen as less likely to succeed if all
stakeholders in Afghan society, such as the government, CSOs, media, and
the private sectors, are involved. 7 In this regard, the EITI process offers
Afghanistan an internationally supported platform from which to closely
scrutinize the government and companies operating in Afghanistan. As such,
positive steps were taken towards engaging with the CSOs to implement the
EITI to avoid Nigeria's experience.
For example, a coalition of CSOs was designed and created to supervise
the implementation of the EITI in 2010.374 It initially consisted of six
organizations and has expanded to thirteen today. Open Society
367 KEBLUSEK, supra note 24, at 13-15.
368 See generally Peter Wass, Initiatives to Promote Civil Society in Botswana in the 1960s: A Personal
Memoir, 36 BOTSWANA NOTES AND RECORDS 74 (2004).
369 See, e.g., Role of Civil Society in HIV and AIDS Response, BOTS. MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
http://www.hiv.gov.bw/content/role-civil-society-hiv-and-aids-response (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).370 id.
371 Gaille, supra note 45, at 92.
372 i
3 Roberto Belloni, Part ofthe Problem or Part ofthe Solution? Civil Society and Corruption in Post-
conflict States, in CORRUPTION AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING: SELLING THE PEACE? 236
(Christine S. Cheng &Dominik Zaum eds., 2012).
" Integrity Watch Afg., supra note 361.
37 id.
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Afghanistan (OSA) and Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) headed this
coalition. OSA is a donor agency that funds transparency projects, and IWA
conducts regular research on natural resource sector issues in Afghanistan.
Jointly, they identified and brought together other interested civil society
stakeholders to participate in the EITI. CSOs are also chosen to be members
of the MSG. 7 6
The CSOs have greatly contributed to the EITI process since the
country's endorsement and candidacy in 2009 to 2010, particularly in the
definition of materiality, the reporting template, and the annual work plan."
Additionally, the CSO, through an official letter to NATO's Secretary
General Rasmussen, expressed the desire and will to work with the Afghan
government to implement the EITI. "' Finally, it was the CSOs that
advocated for the disclosure of the mining contracts, which was seen as a
great achievement for the government and for the CSOs.379
Despite their strong will and desire to work with other stakeholders to
implement the EITI, most of the CSOs in Afghanistan remain weak and
ineffective. Organizationally, Afghanistan's CSOs are small, have minimal
access to information, and are starved for funding. The CSOs are mostly
Kabul-based. 380 None are dedicated solely to extractive industry
transparency. They strive to obtain qualified personnel and may be reluctant
to engage with state actors. 31'When they do succeed in developing into full-
fledged organizations-which usually occurs through access to foreign
funding-they tend to detach themselves from their root constituencies, as
professionalization can have a negative impact on their membership base. As
elite organizations without strong local constituencies, CSOs can be easily
subjected to accusation of being agents of foreign interference in
376id
377id
" Letter from Yama Torabi, Dir., Integrity Watch Mg., Gavin Hayman, Dir. of Campaigns,
Global Witness, & Karin Lissakers, President, Revenue Watch Inst. to Sec'y Gen. Anders Rasmussen,
NATO (May 14, 2012), available at http://ppi.integrityaction.org/sites/ppi.integrityaction.org
/files/publications/CSO%20Chicago%20Letter%20-%20Extractives.pdf.
3 See id.; see also Afghan Government Unveils First Tranche ofMining and Oil Contracts, REVENUE
WATCH INST. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/press releases/opening-
afghanistan%E2%80%99s-extractives-sector-afghan-govemment-unveils-first-tranche.
* INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., CASE STUDY: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.iwaweb.org/-docs/eim/casestudies/eim_csl1
extractiveindustries.transparency-initiative.pdf.
3s Belloni, supra note 373, at 378.
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Afghanistan.3 82
In addition, the CSOs are not taken seriously in Afghanistan."' For
example, CSOs have shown their dissatisfaction with final published
reconciliation reports and the selection process of the reconciler, which was
ignored by the government. These CSOs also lobbied for disaggregated data
reporting, which was ignored for the most part. In addition, they noted in
their comments to the validation report that on many occasions, the
government tried to sideline them.384
On top of that, CSOs in Afghanistan are not as familiar with extractive
issues, and they do not know the social and environmental consequences of
the mining sector.385 Finally, according to the validation report, there is no
formal interaction between the government and CSOs in the Afghanistan
EITI MSG.3"6 The validators believe that the MSG and the Afghan
government have not formalized the basis of CSO participation in the EITI
process.38 ' Therefore, CSOs feel like they are not taken seriously in their
engagement with the EITI, but are merely accepted as stakeholders because
the EITI standards requires the Afghan government to do so.388
Having observed all the flaws that currently exist with CSO engagement
in the EITI implementation, it comes as no surprise that Afghanistan has
not yet met EITI Requirement Six, which mandates that the Afghan
government ensure that civil society is fully involved and engaged in the EITI
process.38 9 The presence of CSOs in implementing the EITI process is an
absolute necessity for Afghanistan to achieve compliant status. Accordingly,
Afghanistan needs to take strong measures to increase the role of CSOs in
implementing the EITI.
Increasing the role of CSOs in implementing the EITI can be framed
within a platform that has already been discussed by the Afghan lead CSOs.
IWA, for instance, urged for a platform that included increasing the role of
CSOs in "coordinating CSOs' positions on oil, gas, and mining issues and
382 Id.
" Integrity Watch Afg., supra note 361.
38 id.
38 Id.
31 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 44.
387 Id.
3
"
8See id. at 31, 39-44.
3" EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 13.
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providing opportunities for CSO capacity building," "raising public
awareness about the effective and transparent management of oil, gas, and
mining," and "identifying priority advocacy issues, such as transparency,
social and environmental issues, preservation of cultural and historical
heritage, anti-corruption, conflict prevention, benefit-sharing with
communities, corporate social responsibility and strengthened donor
coordination."390 As such, the Afghan government needs to support CSOs
to actively participate in each of the vital EITI stages, including decisions on
national governance structures for the EITI, drafts of work plans, designs of
reporting formats, selections of auditors, and analyses of auditor findings.
The active participation of CSOs will require the Afghan government
to take a neutral position and end its influence over CSOs decision making
in the MSG meetings, or else the government could face Nigeria's fate, where
the government was blamed for much of the failure that the country had in
the early stages of implementing the EITI. The government was seen as
having hampered the CSOs' independence and their selection of
representatives.391
Improved accountability will require stronger CSOs in terms of the
ground they cover and their technical expertise. Currently, CSOs are active
only in Kabul.3 92 The Afghan government needs to expand the reach of
CSOs in provinces by providing them with achievable agendas and goals that
are mostly carried out in provinces. As in Botswana's case, the CSOs need to
closely monitor the companies' activities for any labor conditions, social
banter, and environmental issues, and hold them accountable to their
contracts. That can be done through the government's political support and
disclosure of contracts in the public domain.3 93
As far the technical expertise, the Afghan CSOs are not very familiar
with extractive issues and the EITI processes.394 As such, IWA is currently
training a group of CSOs on the technical aspect of EITI and extractive
industries. 95 Additionally, there is a strong demand to train and create a
" Kuai, supra note 340.
' PWYP &RWI, supra note 326, at 15.
39 Integrity Watch Afg., supra note 361.393 id.
394
395 Civil Society Monitoring of the Mining Industry in Afghanistan, NAT'L RES. GOVERNANCE
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foundation for CSOs that can effectively advocate around EITI and mining-
related issues. The Afghan government needs to support these kinds of
training and capacity-building initiatives by providing them with funds
directly or calling for international support to fund the projects. 39
Ultimately, the government needs to hire expert inspectors on mining for
evaluation and progress. Though capacity building has been a priority for the
Afghan government, no clear efforts have been taken so far.m
What appears to be the most serious challenge to the CSOs
participation in the EITI implementation is that they have not been able to
participate filly and formally with the Afghan government because there is
no formal memorandum of understanding between CSOs and the
government. This means that they have not been formally involved in the
EITI implementation process and have not consistently been provided with
the information they need to hold their governments accountable.398 The
Afghan government must formally, through a Memorandum of
Understanding and Terms of Responsibility, recognize and commit to
working with the CSOs irrespective of membership to the coalition of CSOs.
CSO membership and responsibilities should dearly be defined to facilitate
coordination and efforts to improve knowledge sharing among the CSOs.39 9
Finally, in order to provide sufficient and necessary information, the
Afghan government should strengthen provisions with dear, transparent,
and published criteria in all contracts. The contracts should allow the CSOs
to observe with specific terms of reference in the process of awarding
contract. 400
B. The Stakes Associated with Non-Compliancy with the EIT's Principles for
Afghanistan
INST., http://www.revenuewatch.org/grants/civil-society-monitoring-mining-industry-afghanistan (last
visited Oct. 16, 2014).
396 See id.
39 See INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., CASE STUDY: INSPECTING THE SOURCE (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www.iwaweb.org/ docs/eim/case_studies/eimcsllinspecting-the-source.pdf.
39 Aaronson, supra note 325, at 56.
3 Validation Report, supra note 242, at 33.
' Karolina Olofsson, Afghanistan - Avoiding Resource Curse?, Integrity Watch Afg. (July 31,
2011), available at http://ppi-mande.integrityaction.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan-
avoiding-resource-curse_-_july_201 1english-524.pdf.
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1. Temporary Suspension or Delisting
Where it is manifestly clear that significant aspects of the EITI
Principles and Criteria are not adhered to and honored by a candidate or a
compliant country, the EITI Board will suspend or delist that country.401
The EITI Board will also temporarily suspend or delist a country if it fails to
publish the EITI Reports on a regular and timely basis.402 An example of a
delisted country is Equatorial Guinea, which obtained EITI Candidate status
in February 2007 and was required to publish its progress and validation
report by March 2010." It has made little progress towards implementing
and validating the EITI criteria.404 As a result, in late April 2010, Equatorial
Guinea was removed from the list of candidate countries.405
It would be a blow to Afghanistan to be delisted or temporarily
suspended by the EITI Board since Afghanistan is in desperate need of a
strong and effective mechanism to fight corruption in its mining industry and
to help attract foreign investments. Moreover, suspension would further
agitate the western donors who are donating billions of dollars in peace
building and development to Afghanistan.406 It might even be a good reason
to reduce or at some point stop the current aid on which the Afghan
government currently depends. Thus, the stakes are high if the Afghan
government is not committed to the principles of EITI.
2. Signficant Damage to Economic Development
By now, it is evident that corruption affects economic growth and
investment, especially in conflict-affected countries like Afghanistan.4 7 It
affects prospects for investment and economic growth, which determines
4 EITI Rules, supra note 141, at 18.
402 Id. at 66.
" Equatorial Guinea Overview, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/equatorial-guinea (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
404 Id.
0 EITI Newsletter, supra note 188, at 2.
* See Jon Eddy, Rule ofLaw in Afghanistan: The Intrusion ofReality, 17 J. INT'L COOPERATION
STUD. 2, 1 (2009).
1 See Nik Rosnah Wan Abdullah, Eradicating Corruption: The Malaysian Experience, 3 J. ADMIN.
& GOVERNANCE 42 (2008).
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economic viability, peace, and state building. 4 Afghanistan's non-
compliance with the EITI principles would increase the risk of corruption
and would reduce incentives to invest.
As indicated earlier, the studies on the effect of the EITI to attract
foreign investment have indicated a positive result. The incorporation of the
EITI into law will be a major step toward attracting large investors in the
mining sector, and doing so will suggest that Afghanistan is committed to
strengthening institutional factors (i.e., credibility of the government, low
levels of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency, and democratic accountability).
If Afghanistan fails to implement the EITI, its appeal to investors will
diminish and its commitment and willingness to reform, improve
transparency, and fight corruption will be questioned. Currently, investors
are postponing the execution of extractive contracts with the government
because the existing laws are not investor friendly.4" By implementing the
EITI principles, Afghanistan's investment climate will rise; but failing to
abide by those commitments would continue to drive away foreign investors
and prevent foreign investment in Afghanistan.410
3. Falling Prey to the Resource Curse
The resource curse is the final and the most important effect of failing
to bring transparency and effective governance to the mining sector in
Afghanistan. A corrupt natural resource industry worsens governance
practices, thus leading to opposition and conflicts. 411 Weak regulatory
regimes and limited oversight of extractive activities could facilitate the
capture of resources by insurgents in Afghanistan. Ultimately, inadequate
budgetary and expenditure systems allow government to spend resource
revenues on security and defense.412
s Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION 342 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 3d ed., 2002).
' McClanahan, supra note 198.
410 See generally Schmaljohann, supra note 194.
411 See Michael Ross, What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War, 41 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 337-56 (2004); see also Matthias Basedau & Wolfram Lacher, A Paradox ofPlenty? Rent
Distribution and Political Stability in Oil States (Ger. Inst. Global and Area Stud. Working Paper No. 21,
Apr. 2006), available at http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp2lbasedau-
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Lastly, control over natural resources often plays an important role in
armed conflicts, either because warring factions fight over access to natural
resources or because natural resources help finance one or several of the
factions. It increases the desirability of controlling the state, and therefore
heightens motives for going to war. There are many examples of such
financing around the world, including Nigeria, Liberia, and Angola.4 13 But
the most prominent example occurred in the 1990s in Afghanistan. During
the 1990s, Afghanistan was in a civil war and the country's Northern Alliance
financed itself through extraction and sale of forty to sixty million dollars
worth of natural resources. Accordingly, Afghanistan is at risk of falling prey
to the resource curse and returning to civil war because of its natural
resources.414
The EITI facilitates public control over the wealth generated by natural
resources and limits corruption. The EITI has proven highly successful in
reducing the risk of post-conflict countries relapsing into conflict. 415 For
instance, Nigeria is currently making significant progress in promoting
transparency in its natural resource industry and avoiding conflict. This can
also be a good lesson for Afghanistan. If the Taliban and other insurgent
groups can use the money to fund their wartime activities, then the
government can and should take leadership in managing the resources.416
Compliancy with the EITI's principles and criteria are crucially important
for the Afghan government, not just to improve economic development, but
also to reduce conflict incentives.
41 HEIDI FELDT, HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT:
CONFLICTS OVER RESOURCE EXTRACTION (2008), available at
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5396-v-Natural ResourcesandConflict.pdf.
414 See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 49 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1, 13-28 (2002); see also MICHAEL Ross, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CIVIL WAR: AN
OVERVIEW WITH SOME POLICY OPTIONS 21, 30 (Dec. 2002) available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/1091081-1115626319273/20482496/Ross.pdf.
415 GEORG CASPARY & VERENA SEILER, INTL FIN. CORP., SMART LESSONS: EXTRACTIVE
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CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES 2 (Jan. 2011), . available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEXTINDTRAINI/Resources/SmartLessonsFragileEITI.pdf
?resourceuriname=SmartLessonsFragileEITI.pdf.
416 Richard Snyder & Ravi Bhavnani, Diamonds, Bloods, and Taxes.ARevenue-Centered Framework
for Explaining Political Order, 49J. CONFLICT RESOL. 4,567 (Aug. 2005).
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CONCLUSION
The examples of other natural resource-rich countries like Botswana and
Nigeria show that discovery of natural resource can be both a blessing and a
curse depending on how the resource-rich country manages those resources.
Learning from Nigeria's negative experience before joining the EITI,
Afghanistan made a smart move by endorsing and committing to the EITI
to avoid the resource curse. Afghanistan has made significant progress in
implementing the EITI. Natural resource-rich countries like Afghanistan,
with rampant corruption entrenched in all levels of government, have not had
much success in bringing transparency and good governance to their natural
resource industry by merely committing to the EITI's reporting requirement.
While the EITI represents a big step toward bringing transparency and
accountability into extractive industries, resource-rich countries need to take
stronger measures to build sustainable legal frameworks and develop
leadership. Nigeria, for instance, has taken a strong first step towards
transparency by implementing EITI's principles and incorporating its
requirements in its domestic laws.
This paper shows that Afghanistan currently lacks a sound legal and
regulatory framework, strong and committed leadership, and an effective
MSG to bring transparency to revenue management of extractive industries.
Despite these apparent challenges in implementing the EITI in extractive
industries, Afghanistan has made considerable progress by publishing
reconciliation reports and identifying discrepancies. Whether Afghanistan
can live up to the EITI's expectation will depend on how strongly civil society
influence the audit system in the contracting and publishing process, how the
government will bring change to the legal and regulatory framework, and
whether government leaders will fulfill their promises to the international
community.
